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EQUALITY AND NONDISCRIMINATION THROUGH THE
EYES OF AN INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS
ORGANIZATION: THE ORGANIZATION OF ISLAMIC
COOPERATION’S (OIC) RESPONSE TO WOMEN’S
RIGHTS
ROBERT C. BLITT*
ABSTRACT
This article is the first of a two part series that draws on
women‘s rights and sexual orientation and gender identity (SOGI) to
explore how the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) represents,
interprets and seeks to impact the right to equality and protection against
discrimination as enshrined under international human rights law. The
study is a novel one inasmuch as the OIC is neither a state nor a religious
group per se. Rather, the OIC stands out as the only contemporary
intergovernmental organization unifying its member states around the
commonality of a single religion. In this capacity, the organization
maintains no direct obligations or rights under key instruments such as
the Universal Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR) or the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).
Nevertheless, as part of its mandate representing 57
predominantly Muslim states, the OIC has increasingly asserted a role
for itself on the international stage as ―the collective voice of the Muslim
world.‖ This new assertiveness is particularly evident in the context of
debates surrounding the content of human rights norms in international
fora such as the United Nations, where the OIC has sought to develop
common policy positions and encourage its members to vote as a bloc on
issues of concern. Against this backdrop, the article concludes that
supporters of universal human rights norms need to better understand
how the OIC‘s mission to ―protect and defend the true image of Islam‖
may impact international debates over the substance of equality and
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nondiscrimination norms, and develop appropriate responses to these
efforts as a means to ensure that universality is not undermined.
This article begins with a brief introduction to the OIC, and
proceeds to explore its relationship with the principles of equality and
nondiscrimination by examining its founding document and other
relevant primary sources. With this understanding in place, the paper
turns to examine the OIC‘s contemporary handling of these principles as
manifested in debates surrounding women‘s rights as well as the
relevance and impact of ―Islamic family values‖ on the scope of those
rights. This article‘s exploration of ―family values‖ also serves as a pivot
point to begin framing rights issues related to Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual,
Transgender, and Intersex (LGBTI) individuals and related SOGI issues.
Throughout this examination, the role of the OIC‘s newly established
Independent Permanent Human Rights Commission (IPHRC) is
considered as a means of appraising whether a shift in the OIC‘s position
may be forthcoming.
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INTRODUCTION
Comprised of fifty-seven predominantly Muslim member states,
the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) describes itself as the
―second largest inter-governmental organization after the United
Nations‖ and ―the collective voice of the Muslim world,‖ whose raison
d‟être is to ―safeguard and protect the interests of the Muslim world.‖1 In
asserting this mandate, the OIC also embodies the only contemporary
intergovernmental organization that claims to unify its member states
around the common banner of a single religion.2
At the United Nations (UN), the OIC maintains official observer
status and represents nearly a third of all UN member states.3

1

2

3

ORGANISATION
OF
ISLAMIC
COOPERATION,
History,
http://www.oicoci.org/page/?p_id=52&p_ref=26&lan=en.
Abdel Monem Al-Mashat, The Organization of the Islamic Conference and the Post Cold War
Era, in THE ORGANIZATION OF THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE IN A CHANGING WORLD 147, 150
(Mohammad El Sayed Selim ed., 1994). Ioana Cismas describes the OIC as ―the sole intergovernmental actor to display religious contours and to claim the role of interpreter of human
rights in the context of Islam‖ and an organization where ―the role of religion is intertwined with
political goals.‖ IOANA CISMAS, RELIGIOUS ACTORS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 239, 241 (2014).
The OIC has maintained observer status at the UN since 1975. The UN General Assembly also
regularly adopts by consensus resolutions on ―Cooperation between the United Nations and the
Organization of Islamic Cooperation.‖ See G.A. Res. 3369 (Oct. 10, 1975); see also G.A. Res.
67/264 (May 15, 2013).
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Nevertheless, since adoption of its original Charter in 1972,4 the OIC
generally has had limited success placing communal interests above the
realpolitik interests of its individual member states.5 This reality stems in
part from the fact that the organization‘s members—despite sharing the
commonality of a religion broadly framed6—harbor a sweeping diversity
of cultures, legal traditions, and development levels, as well as
longstanding political and religious rivalries.7 From this admixture,
wealthy and traditionally conservative states—with Saudi Arabia as the
vanguard—emerged with primary control over the organizational reins of
power and influence.8 By the late 1990s, a former OIC assistant secretary
general described the resulting institutional product as:
a conglomeration of staggering disparities in terms of size,
population, wealth, human development, state of political evolution,
and political systems. The regional issues and local conflicts,
domestic tensions and vulnerability to external interference have

4

5

6

7

8

Organization of the Islamic Conference, Charter of the Organization of the Islamic Conference,
Mar. 4, 1972.
According to one blunt critique leveled by a former Pakistani diplomat in the mid-1990s:
―Suffice it to say that the OIC is in a coma. There are internal causes and external circumstances
for it.‖ S.M. Koreshi, Security and Development Interests of OIC Countries in Post Gulf War
Era, in OIC: CONTEMPORARY ISSUES OF THE MUSLIM WORLD 141, 145 (Ghulam Sarwar, ed.,
1997); a more nuanced assessment offers that ―The overall picture which emerges . . . of the
performance of the OIC . . . is that we are dealing with an organization which had made
significant advances in the areas of technical co-operation . . . but had achieved very little in the
areas of collective security and the peaceful resolution of disputes.‖ Mohammad El Sayed Selim,
An Evaluation of the Performance of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, in THE
ORGANIZATION OF THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE IN A CHANGING WORLD 136 (2011).
Nine states retain OIC membership despite the absence of a majority Muslim population. The
revised 2008 OIC Charter now requires as a condition of membership that any state seeking to
join the OIC have a Muslim majority. OIC, Charter of the Organization of the Islamic
Conference, Mar. 14, 2008, at art. 3(2).
The divisions among OIC member states are as stark as they are numerous. Consider just a few:
on resources, oil-rich and oil-poor; on constitutions, declared secular and declared Islamic; on
relationships with the United States, friend and foe; on population diversity, virtually 100 percent
Muslim and below 50 percent Muslim; and on Islamic denomination, Sunni and Shi‘a. Early
opposition to the OIC from secular Muslim states stressed that the rationale underpinning the
OIC—the use of Islam as a unifying political tool—went ―against the spirit of modern nations.‖
Abdullahil Ahsan, Muslim Society in Crisis: A Case Study of the Organization of the Islamic
Conference 51 (1985) (unpublished PhD dissertation, History, University of Michigan). In 1994,
Al Mashat concluded, ―National interests over shadow the doctrines and the ideological basis of
the OIC.‖ Al Mashat, supra note 2, at 151.
One observer attributes this dynamic to four factors: Saudi King Faisal drove the original
initiative for the OIC; its headquarters is situated in Jeddah; the Saudi government contributed
―around 10 percent of the OIC budget, and most of the high-ranking as well as middle ranking
officials‖; and finally, the Saudis secured support from other conservative states as well as those
on the receiving end of Saudi financial assistance. Sohrab Shahabi, OIC and Its Prospects for the
Future, in OIC: CONTEMPORARY ISSUES OF THE MUSLIM WORLD, supra note 5, at 173–74..

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2978646

BLITT_PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

Vol. 34, No. 4

5/9/2017 1:14 PM

OIC‟s Response to Women‟s Rights

759

further weakened the collective resolve. . .were it not already there, it
would be impossible to invent an OIC under the prevailing situation
amounting to chaos. Therefore, the OIC, despite its manifold
weaknesses, must be preserved.9

More recently, however, the OIC has attempted to reinvigorate
its international relevance. This effort is reflected in the OIC‘s 2005 Tenyear Programme of Action to Meet the Challenges Facing the Muslim
Ummah10 and in its revised 2008 Charter.11 Some observers also attribute
the organization‘s pivot away from a restrictive—and ineffective—
posture to the leadership Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu, the OIC‘s Secretary
General from 2004 to 2014.12 The outcome of these developments has
engendered a conscious effort to systematize and deepen the nature of
OIC engagement on the international level, particularly as it relates to
international human rights. Although the OIC has affirmed the UN vision
of universal human rights norms, it simultaneously advocates within the
UN system to promote its own Islamic worldview and continues to
endorse a parallel system of treaties that would govern its member states‘
conduct on the basis of Islamic norms.13 This approach is evident in the
organization‘s continued drive to enforce bloc voting among its members

9

10

11
12

13

Refaqat Syed, Organisation of the Islamic Conference: Dream and Reality, in OIC:
CONTEMPORARY ISSUES OF THE MUSLIM WORLD, supra note 5 at 221.
Ten-year programme of action to meet the challenges facing the Muslim Ummah in the 21st
century, Third Extraordinary Session of the Islamic Summit Conference (2005); perhaps the
biggest paradox here is that while the OIC invokes the foundational Islamic principle of
ummah—a ―brotherhood more vital than that of blood‖ or a bond to transcend all other bonds—
its Charter is premised on the modern nation state and holds as sacrosanct the secular legal
principle of state sovereignty; See Katja L.H. Samuel, THE OIC, THE UN, AND COUNTERTERRORISM LAW-MAKING: CONFLICTING OR COOPERATIVE LEGAL ORDERS? 30 (2013) (citing
John A. Williams, THEMES OF ISLAMIC CIVILIZATION (1971)); see also Ahsan, supra note 7, at
65; see also Alpaslan Özerdem, The Contribution of the Organization of the Islamic Conference
to the Peace Process in Mindanao, in EXTERNAL INTERVENTIONS IN CIVIL WARS: THE ROLE
AND IMPACT OF REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS 97, 98 (Stefan Wolff and Oya
Dursun-Özkanca eds., 2014) (arguing that upholding the premise of nation states represents a
serious disruption in the connection between individual Muslims and the ummah, which is
intended to be a single collectivity that rejects nation state sovereignty).
See 2008 OIC Charter, supra note 6.
Melinda Negrón-Gonzales, Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), in INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS AND THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: THE
HUMANITARIAN CRISIS IN SYRIA 90, 90-91 (Daniel Silander and Don Wallace eds., 2015)
(describing Ihsanoglu as ―reformist‖ and—in his own words—as promoting ―modernization and
moderation‖). This shift may have been short-lived given that, since January 2014, the OIC
Secretariat is led by a Saudi secretary general.
Katja Samuel, Universality, the UN and the Organization of the Islamic Conference: Single,
Complementary or Competing Universal Legal Orders?, in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A
MULTIPOLAR WORLD 263, 275 (Matthew Happold ed., 2012).
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at the United Nations,14 as well as in the development of an OIC treaty
framework to regulate human rights, including the rights of children and
women, on the basis of unspecified Islamic norms.15
Throughout this revitalized engagement, the OIC has assumed a
unique role. The OIC is neither a state nor a centralized religious
organization authorized to represent the Muslim faith or authoritatively
interpret or enforce Islamic law. Yet, its initiatives suggest a desire to
vitiate existing international human rights norms by subjecting them to a
parochial ―poison pill‖ based on the OIC‘s conception of Islamic human
rights. As this article argues, the failure to decisively reject the OIC‘s
efforts to promulgate a religiously-justified and restrictive framing of
equality and nondiscrimination risks undermining the spirit of
universality reflected in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(UDHR) grundnorm that ―all human beings are born free and equal in
dignity and rights,‖16 and more immediately, legitimizes ongoing rights
violations against women as well as lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender,
and intersex (LGBTI) persons, among others.
To better understand the OIC‘s vision for equality and
nondiscrimination and its potential impact on international norms, this
article begins by examining how the organization‘s foundational and
other early primary documents relate to the principles of equality and
nondiscrimination. The article then explores the OIC‘s more recent
attempts to mainstream human rights and weighs the extent to which
treatment of equality and nondiscrimination has evolved or been
elaborated by the institution, including through the establishment of a

14

15

16

Organization of Islamic Cooperation [OIC], Final Communique of the Annual Coordination
Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the OIC Member States, ¶ 122 (Sept. 27, 2013)
(―The Meeting urged Member States to implement Resolution No. 41/37-POL on coordination
and voting patterns of Member States at the United Nations and other international and
multilateral fora.‖); more recently, the OIC has ―insisted that failure to vote for [OIC-backed
resolutions at the UN] and announcement of positions different from those agreed on is contrary
to the unanimity imposed by the duty of Islamic solidarity among Member States.‖ OIC Doc.
OIC/13TH SUMMIT 2016/FC/FINAL, ¶ 199 (Apr. 14–15, 2016).
To date, this framework includes a Covenant on the Rights of the Child in Islam, and plans for an
Islamic Charter on Human Rights, a Covenant on the Rights of the Women in Islam, an Islamic
Covenant against Racial Discrimination, as well as an International Islamic Court of Justice
intended to function as a principal OIC organ. At the time of writing, each of these is at a
different stage of development, though none have reached the point of entering into force. Robert
C. Blitt, The Bottom Up Journey of “Defamation of Religion” from Muslim States to the United
Nations: A Case Study of the Migration of Anti-Constitutional Ideas, in STUDIES IN LAW,
POLITICS, AND SOCIETY 121, 172-173 (2011).
G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948), at art. 1
[hereinafter UDHR].
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new Independent Permanent Human Rights Commission (IPHRC). With
this baseline established, the remainder of the article focuses on the
OIC‘s approach to women‘s rights to help understand how the
organization‘s positions directly impact the scope and interpretation of
equality and nondiscrimination. In addition to considering the OIC‘s own
policies aimed at addressing disparities impacting women and its posture
vis á vis international treaty bodies, this section will also unpack the
OIC‘s campaign to promote ―protection of the family‖, inasmuch as this
effort exposes women to further risk of inequality and discrimination,
and also serves as a pivot point to begin framing the OIC‘s approach to
LGBTI rights and related SOGI issues. The article concludes by
considering the OIC‘s position moving forward and by offering
recommendations for ensuring respect for the universal right to equality
and nondiscrimination.
I. THE BLUNDER YEARS: THE OIC’S EARLY TAKE ON EQUALITY AND
NONDISCRIMINATION
A. 1972 CHARTER OF THE ORGANIZATION OF THE ISLAMIC
CONFERENCE
The only reference to equality contained in the OIC‘s 1972
Charter relates to equality between member states of the organization.17
The Charter makes no reference to family, women, Islamophobia,18
defamation of religion, or Shari‘ah.19 At the same time, the preamble
reaffirms the ―commitment to the UN Charter and fundamental Human
Rights‖ and acknowledges the principle of nondiscrimination.20 The
preamble also expresses resolve ―to preserve Islamic spiritual, ethical,
social and economic values,‖21 while it omits any explicit references

17
18

19
20
21

1972 OIC CHARTER, supra note 4, at art. II(B)(1).
Omission of ―Islamophobia‖ is not surprising inasmuch as the term was not coined until the early
1990s. See University of California, Berkeley Center for Race and Gender Islamophobia
Research
&
Documentation
Project,
Defining
“Islamophobia”,
http://crg.berkeley.edu/content/islamophobia/defining-islamophobia (―The term ‗Islamophobia‘
was first introduced as a concept in a 1991 Runnymede Trust Report and defined as ‗unfounded
hostility towards Muslims, and therefore fear or dislike of all or most Muslims.‘ The term was
coined in the context of Muslims in the UK in particular and Europe in general, and formulated
based on the more common ‗xenophobia‘ framework‖).
1972 OIC CHARTER, supra note 4, at art. II(B)(1).
Id. at preamble.
Id.
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either to Shari‘ah or Islamic legal norms. Specific organizational
objectives contained in the OIC‘s 1972 Charter include: promoting
Islamic solidarity; eliminating racial discrimination, segregation, and
colonialism; and supporting all Muslims ―with a view to preserving their
dignity, independence and national rights.‖22 This document‘s limited
aspirations—and its primary invocation of Palestine as a rallying call for
all Muslim states23—betrays the significant divisions that colored the
Muslim world at the time, as well as the states‘ preoccupation with their
own national priorities.24
B. OIC CAIRO DECLARATION ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN ISLAM
Twenty years later, the OIC promulgated its Cairo Declaration
on Human Rights in Islam (CDHRI).25 This document emerged from a
long and convoluted internal drafting process that spanned nearly a
22
23

24

25

Id. at art. II(A)(1), (3) and (6).
Id. at art. II(A)(5) and V(2)(e)(ii) (establishing as an OIC objective supporting the ―struggle of
the people of Palestine, to help them regain their rights and liberate their land‖); see also
ARSHAD-UZ ZAMAN, PRIVILEGED WITNESS: MEMOIRS OF A DIPLOMAT 218-219 (2000)
(observing ―of all the activities of the OIC, Palestine held the most important place. … Although
there were many political issues that the OIC was grappling with, Palestine and Jerusalem
remained on the top of the agenda‖); see also Syed, supra note 9, at 217 (concluding the ―OIC
became not a vehicle but a captive of [the Palestine] issue. . . . Having developed a very strong
position within the Secretariat, and playing upon the emotional content of the issue, [the
Palestine Liberation Organization] would not permit other issues to be brought at par with the
issues related to Palestine.‖); see also Ahsan, supra note 7, at 99 (concluding ―[t]he OIC has only
succeeded in mobilizing all its members on the issue of Palestine. In spite of this complete
mobilization, the OIC has failed to achieve its goals even on that issue. . . . OIC countries had
stronger commitments to nation-state identity than to the Ummah identity‖). As a concrete
manifestation of this reality, consider for example that one-third of the political resolutions from
the 1990 Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers were dedicated to the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict. See Organization of Islamic Cooperation [OIC], Report and Resolutions on Political,
Legal
and
Information
Affairs
(Jul.
31–Aug.
5,
1990),
http://www.oicoci.org/english/conf/fm/19/19%20icfm-political-en.htm.
According to former OIC Secretary General Ihsanoglu, the 1972 OIC Charter ―did not get more
than 23 signatures over its 40 years of existence.‖ Secretary General Prof. Ekmeleddin
Ihsanoglu, Address of OIC Secretary General to the Senior Officials Preparatory Meeting for the
37th Session of the Council of Foreign Ministers (Apr. 12-14, 2010) OIC Doc. OIC/SOM/37CFM/2010/SG.SP, 11. In contrast, the 2008 OIC Charter secured 39 signatures and 14
ratifications within two years. 2008 OIC Charter, supra note 6.
The document emerged from an internal drafting process that can be traced back to at least 1984.
See Final Communique, Fifteenth Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers, Dec. 18-22, 1984, ¶
E (―The Conference decided to entrust the General Secretariat with the task of‖ requesting
member states to designate their respective experts for a meeting of a legal committee to
examine anew the draft declaration of human rights in Islam in terms of content); see also
Sixteenth Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers, Jan. 6-10, 1986, Resolution No. 2/16-ORG
Human Rights In Islam.
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decade. In 1981, the Third Islamic Summit Conference‘s Mecca
Declaration approved a decision to bring a draft document on human
rights in Islam before a committee of member state representatives for
the purpose of studying its content.26 Two years later, the OIC
Conference of Foreign Ministers (CFM) approved the draft instrument
under the title ―Dhaka Declaration of Human Rights in Islam.‖27 Yet,
shortly after the CFM meeting, the OIC heads of state abruptly decided
to validate only part of the declaration and to postpone its decision on
endorsement of the entire draft until further study could be completed.28
Reviewing the substance of the Dhaka Declaration may help
shed some light on why it was walked back. More religious exaltation
than human rights text, the document states, among other things, that it:
Proceed[s] from the faith of absolute oneness of God which is the
basis of Islam and which calls UPON all mankind to worship no one
but Allah; believe[s] in fulfilling the injunctions of the unchanging
Islamic SHARIAH which calls for the safeguarding of man‘s
religion, soul, mind, honour, wealth and progeny, and which is
universal in its applicability and is characterised by moderation in all
its principles and rulings, which combines spirit with matter, and
which balances individual rights and obligations and collective
privileges . . . ; affirm[s] his freedom and right to a dignified life in
accordance with the Islamic Shariah; believe[s] that all human beings
from [sic] one family whose members are united by their
subordination to Allah . . . [and believes] no one has superiority over
another except on the basis of piety. 29

With at least part of the Dhaka Declaration in the trash bin of history, the
CFM tasked the OIC General Secretariat with identifying experts from
member states to reexamine the draft declaration of human rights in
Islam and make changes to ―content and phraseology, in the light of the
observations made by member states.‖30 Four years later, in 1988, a
revised final text emerged and in turn was referred to the member states‘
ministers of justice for study and finalization.31

26
27
28
29

30
31

Third Islamic Summit Conference, Mecca Declaration, Jan. 25-28, 1981.
Fourteenth Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers, Final Declaration, Dec. 6-11, 1983, at ¶ 24.
Fourth Islamic Summit Conference, Final Communique, Jan. 16-19, 1984, at ¶ 28.
Fourteenth Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers, The Dhaka Declaration on Human Rights
in Islam, Dec. 6- 11, 1983. For a more detailed treatment of the Dhaka Declaration, see Jan
Hjarpe, The Contemporary Debate in the Muslim World on the Definition of “Human Rights”, in
ISLAM: STATE AND SOCIETY 26, 34–37 (Klaus Ferdinand & Mehdi Mozaffari eds., 1988).
Sixteenth Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers, supra note 25.
The Seventeenth Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers, Resolution No. 44/17-P On the Draft
Document On Human Rights In Islam, Mar. 21-25, 1988.
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The revised and final Cairo Declaration, approved in 1990,
represents the first authorized and concerted effort to express the OIC‘s
position on human rights.32 Although the CDHRI is not a treaty, and
therefore is not a legally binding document, the OIC‘s express intention
was that the document, ―serve as a guide for Member States in all aspects
of life.‖33 And while the CDHRI text certainly overhauled some of the
Dhaka Declaration‘s religious fervor, its provisions still signaled a sharp
break from norms enshrined in the UDHR and its sister covenants on
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)34 and Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights (ICESCR).35
For example, under the CDHRI, religion represents a legitimate
basis for discrimination and restricting the right to marriage,36 women‘s
equality is limited to ―human dignity,‖ and men and women retain
gender-specific rights and responsibilities.37 Furthermore, freedom of
movement is a right assigned only to men and is restricted based on ―the
framework of Shari‘ah.‖38 Likewise, freedom of opinion, expression, and
access to information are all restricted on the basis of Shari‘ah.39 Beyond
these specific, religion-informed limitations, the CDHRI contains two
overarching provisions that make all rights contingent upon undefined
religious law and further require that any definition of rights occur in an
Islamic vacuum detached from international human rights instruments.
The provisions state:
Art. 24: All the rights and freedoms stipulated in this
Declaration are subject to the Islamic Shari‟ah.

32

33

34

35

36

37
38
39

Organization of Islamic Cooperation, Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam, Aug. 5,
1990, Annex to Res. No. 49/19-P [hereinafter CDHRI].
19th Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers, Resolution No. 49/19-P On the Cairo Declaration
on Human Rights in Islam (Session of Peace, Interdependence and Development), Jul. 31-Aug.
5, 1990.
See G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Mar. 23,
1976) [hereinafter ICCPR].
G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Dec.
16, 1966).
CDHRI, supra note 32, at art. 5 (―Men and women have the right to marriage, and no restrictions
stemming from race, colour or nationality shall prevent them from enjoying this right.‖); see also
Contribution of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference, UN DOC.
A/CONF.157/PC/62/Add.18, (June 9, 1993).
CDHRI, supra note 32, at art. 6.
Id. at art. 12.
Id. at art. 22.
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Art. 25: The Islamic Shari‟ah is the only source of reference for
the explanation or clarification of any of the articles of this
Declaration.40
Despite the CDHRI‘s stark departure from a universal approach to
human rights, the OIC publicized the declaration as the organization‘s
―contribution‖41 to the landmark 1993 UN World Conference on Human
Rights,42 delivering it to the Conference‘s secretary general together with

40
41

42

Id. at arts. 24, 25.
Twenty-First Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers, Resolution No. 41/21-P On Coordination
Among Member States in the Field of Human Rights, Apr. 25-29, 1993, art. 19. (Session of
Islamic Unity and Cooperation for Peace, Justice and Progress).
World Conference on Human Rights, June 14-25, 1993, Vienna, Austria, OFFICE OF THE UNITED
NATIONS
HIGH
COMMISSIONER
FOR
HUMAN
RIGHTS,
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/AboutUs/Pages/ViennaWC.aspx (last visited Mar. 5, 2017). The UN
subsequently included the CDHRI—alongside regional instruments from the Organization of
American States, the Council of Europe, the Organization of African Unity, and the Conference
for Security and Co-operation in Europe—in a handbook compiling various international human
rights instruments. U.N. OFFICE HIGH COMM‘R HUMAN RIGHTS, HUMAN RIGHTS: A
COMPILATION OF INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS, U.N. Doc. UN-ST/HR/1/Rev. 5 (Vol. II), U.N.
Sales No. E.97.XIV.1 (1997). At least one NGO expressed ―deep concern‖ over the decision to
include the CDHRI as a ―regional instrument‖ in a UN publication. In a written statement to the
UN Commission on Human Rights from 1999, the Association for World Education (AWE)—
noting it was still ―awaiting an explanation as to when, why, and by whom such an important
decision was officially made‖—reasoned the OIC was not a ―regional‖ body and the CDHRI
could not ―correctly be defined as a ‗regional instrument.‘‖ Moreover, based on CDHRI arts. 24
and 25, AWE argued the declaration‘s authors made ―very clear that Sharia law has supremacy,
and CDHRI has primacy. . .over other international instruments.‖ AWE‘s statement proposed
deleting the CDHRI from any future reprinting, or alternatively, that the ―Office of the High
Commissioner should provide an explanation and a legal justification for the retention of an
essentially religious document in a volume purporting to contain regional and international
United Nations instruments on human rights.‖ Comm‘n on Human Rights, Letter dated Dec. 20,
1999 The Association for World Education to UN Commission on Human Rights, UN Doc.
E/CN.4/2000/NGO/3 (Jan. 20, 2000) (statement title: ―The 1990 ‗Cairo Declaration of Human
Rights in Islam‘ (CDHRI) is neither a ‗regional‘ instrument nor a United Nations ‗international
instrument‘‖). Without apparent explanation, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for
Human Rights dropped the Cairo Declaration from the subsequent edition of its handbook,
published in 2002. U.N. OFFICE HIGH COMM‘R HUMAN RIGHTS, HUMAN RIGHTS: A
COMPILATION OF INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS, U.N. Doc. ST/HR/1/Rev.6 (Vol. II) (2002).
Despite this correction, the CDHRI (together with other OIC instruments, including the
Covenant on the Rights of the Child in Islam) remains included in another UN publication, THE
RIGHT TO HUMAN RIGHTS EDUCATION: A COMPILATION OF PROVISIONS OF INTERNATIONAL
AND REGIONAL INSTRUMENTS DEALING WITH HUMAN RIGHTS EDUCATION, most recently
published in 2014. Of note, this publication appears to downgrade the status of the OIC‘s
contribution from ―regional instrument‖ to ―other instrument‖ (placing it alongside Francophonie
and Commonwealth documents), but indicates no concern for the fact that the OIC‘s standards
may conflict with applicable international and regional norms. The Right to Human Rights
Education: A Compilation of Provisions of International and Regional Instruments Dealing with
Human Rights Education, OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN
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a resolution reaffirming the OIC‘s ―strong commitment‖43 to the
promotion and protection of the rights of women in accordance with
CDHRI article 6.44
Professor Ioana Cismas has remarked that CDHRI article 24
―engenders a mala fide bias against OIC states, which in most cases is
undeserved.‖45 Although it is accurate to observe that only some OIC
member states boast constitutional repugnancy clauses that station
Shari‘ah at the apex of the legal regime, explaining away the CDHRI‘s
incorporation of such a provision as a perceived effort to placate
conservative OIC member states distorts the overall tone and substance
of the declaration.46 A plain reading of the CDHRI reveals that it does not
merely mollify but rather is dominated by a conservative element averse
to universal human rights.47 Further, the inclusion of article 25, which
makes Shari‘ah the only permissible reference source for explaining or
clarifying the rights contained in the document,48 should dispel any
impression that the CDHRI signals a meaningful compromise between
moderate and conservative forces within the OIC. By subjecting
individual rights protections to the vagaries of indeterminate religious
law, articles 24 and 25 untether the CDHRI from any internationally
recognized human rights norms or practices.49 Cismas offers that article
25 is ―unfortunate . . . because it does not represent the view of the
majority of Muslim states.‖50 Yet, this timid conclusion belies the simple
fact that the document offers no indication it accommodates an
alternative silent majority of OIC states that presumably would have

43
44

45
46

47
48
49
50

RIGHTS
(Sep.
2014),
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Education/Training/Compilation/Pages/Listofcontents.aspx#OI
C.
Twenty-First Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers, supra note 41, at art. 15.
CDHRI article 6 provides: ―(a) Woman is equal to man in human dignity, and has rights to enjoy
as well as duties to perform; she has her own civil entity and financial independence, and the
right to retain her name and lineage. (b) The husband is responsible for the support and welfare
of the family.‖ CDHRI, supra note 32, at art. 6.
CISMAS, supra note 2, at 275.
For example, article 3 of Afghanistan‘s constitution provides ―no law can be contrary to the
sacred religion of Islam and the values of this Constitution.‖ Elsewhere, however, Islamic
principles may be constitutionally recognized, but neither self-executing nor judicially
enforceable. See Tad Stahnke & Robert C. Blitt, The Religion-State Relationship and the Right to
Freedom of Religion or Belief: A Comparative Textual Analysis of the Constitutions of
Predominantly Muslim Countries, 36 GEO. J. INT‘L L. 947, 951 (2005).
See CDHRI, supra note 32.
Id. at art. 25.
Id. at arts. 24–25.
CISMAS, supra note 2, at 276.
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sought to situate the CDHRI more squarely in the camp of universal
rights.
In contrast, Yakin Ertürk, a former UN Special Rapporteur on
violence against women, offers a more critical indictment of the Cairo
Declaration. Ertürk observes that the CDHRI represents ―a dominant,
discriminatory paradigm [that] is presented as the only legitimate
interpretation, whereas the diverse voices existing within each culture are
silenced, particularly if they are those of women or other already
marginalized groups.‖51 According to Ertürk, the CDHRI is deliberately
ambiguous in its provision of women‘s equality and manipulates rights
terminology to contest women‘s rights, ―including the primacy [of the]
right to a life free from gender-based violence.‖52 Based on these
findings, Ertürk concludes that the Cairo Declaration, as a regional
normative framework, is ―incoherent with the universal framework that
has legal precedence over [it],‖53 and ―pretends that there is one
homogeneous Muslim view of Islamic values,‖54 despite competing
interpretations raised ―by many others including local human rights
activists living in Islamic countries or in exile, reformist clerics and selfproclaimed Islamic feminists and women‘s rights activists.‖55
A religious perspective that contrasts with Ertürk‘s is useful for
understanding the scope of the tension between localized and universal
rights frameworks.
We know that the primary obligation of a Muslim is to submit
himself to the will of Allah Almighty. When a person chooses to
embrace Islam, he necessarily submits to the Quranic value system.
The [UDHR], on the other hand, advocates absolute freedom of
behavior [sic]. Now, one fails to understand, how the two value
systems, which are diametrically opposed to each other in their

51

52
53
54

55

U.N. Human Rights Council, UN Human Rights Council: Report of the Special Rapporteur on
Violence against Women, Its Causes and Consequences on Intersections between Culture and
Violence
against
Women,
¶
60,
Jan.
17,
2007,
A/HRC/4/34,
http://www.refworld.org/docid/461e2c602.html.
Id. at ¶ 40.
Id. at ¶ 41.
Id. at ¶ 60; This author was able to locate only one OIC response to Ertürk‘s report, which
suggested it would have been more appropriate for the special rapporteur to focus on impunity as
an important source of violence against women rather than dominant cultural paradigms. U.N.
Human Rights Council, Compte Rendu Analytique de la 15e Séance Tenue au Palais des
Nations, Genëve, Mar. 20, 2007, UN Doc. A/HRC/4/SR.15, ¶ 32 (Pakistan on behalf of the OIC:
―l‘OCI considère qu‘il aurait été plus approprieé de mentionner, comme cause importante de
violence contre les femmes, la culture de l‘impunité plutôt que les paradigmes culturels
dominants.‖).
U.N. Human Rights Council, supra note 51, at ¶ 60.
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approach, would reconcile. No Muslim would forego Quranic values
for the sake of Western concept of freedom of conscience or for the
sake of European secular values. . . . Obviously, Muslim countries
cannot allow . . . [any] abhorable [sic] practice [such as sexual
relationships outside of marriage] [that] runs counter to Quranic
values.56

As noted above, the CDHRI does not generate legal obligations or means
for its enforcement. This has not, however, precluded the OIC from using
the declaration as an ongoing touchstone and rallying point for
engagement on human rights issues. Still, other observers argue that the
Cairo Declaration is a failed document because of ―its demonstrated lack
of influence on OIC members.‖57 The following analysis indicates that
even if individual member states have grown publicly embarrassed or
aloof over the CDHRI, the OIC acting on the international level as the
―collective voice of the Muslim world‖ remains committed to the
declaration. The OIC, furthermore, continues to invoke it not merely as a
―contribution‖ to the international community, but as the institution‘s
foundational benchmark for engaging with and limiting the impact of
international human rights norms.58 In the recent words of OIC Secretary
General Iyad Ameen Madani, ―The Cairo Declaration on Human Rights
in Islam embodies the OIC‘s most complete statement on human rights
in Islam as seen by the Member States.‖59

56

57

58

59

Ghulam Sarwar, Introduction, in OIC: CONTEMPORARY ISSSUES OF THE MUSLIM WORLD, supra
note 5, at 15. The UDHR does not, as the writer erroneously asserts, advocate ―absolute freedom
of behavior.‖ Rather it applies a general limitation clause to all rights: ―In the exercise of his
rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such limitations as are determined by law
solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of
others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a
democratic society.‖ UDHR, supra note 16, at art. 29(2).
To support this conclusion, Cismas considers, among other things, the extent to which OIC
member states invoke the CDHRI in their reporting to the UN. CISMAS, supra note 2, at 304.
For example, the CDHRI is prominently listed on the website of the OIC‘s new human rights
commission under ―OIC Human Rights Related Instruments and Texts‖ and comes before other
international human rights documents. See Organization of Islamic Cooperation, Legal
Instruments, INDEP. PERMANENT HUMAN RIGHTS COMM‘N: ORG. OF ISLAMIC COOPERATION,
http://www.oic-iphrc.org/en/legal/ (last visited Mar. 5, 2017). Numerous additional examples
highlighting the ongoing application and centrality of the CDHRI are discussed in Parts III and
IV below. See infra notes 73, 128, 216, 224, and 229 (discussing OIC follow up on the CDHRI,
follow up and coordination of OIC human rights work, the OIC human rights commission
mandate, the OIC women‘s development organization, the OIC human rights commission‘s use
of the CDHRI, and the evolving nature of rights protections provided under the CDHRI).
Iyad Ameen Madani, Org. of Islamic Cooperation Sec‘y Gen., Statement at the Fourth Session of
the OIC Independent Permanent Human Rights Commission (IPHRC) (Feb. 2, 2014).
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II. LAYING THE FOUNDATION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
“MAINSTREAMING” AT THE OIC: NEW POLICIES AND INSTITUTIONS
A. A TEN YEAR PROGRAM OF ACTION AND MUCH ADO ABOUT ISLAMIC
HUMAN RIGHTS COVENANTS
The 1972 OIC Charter and the 1990 CDHRI represent the OIC‘s
first foray into international engagement on the substance of human
rights. As time passed, the organization elaborated its initially hesitant
policy in this area. In 2005, the OIC announced a milestone ten-year
strategic action plan (Ten Year Program) intended to set out the
challenges facing the Muslim world and the ―means to address them.‖60
The document explicitly recognizes the principle of equality in two key
places. First, under the heading ―Human Rights and Good Governance,‖
the Program calls to ―[s]eriously endeavor to enlarge the scope of
political participation, ensure equality, civil liberties and social justice
and to promote transparency and accountability, and eliminate corruption
in the OIC Member States.‖61 The provision is silent as to the nature of
the equality to be guaranteed, and leaves open the question of whether
such equality would apply to all individuals without distinction of any
kind or be limited in some way.
The Ten Year Program‘s second reference to equality, however,
overtly betrays that the OIC‘s conceptualization of equality falls short of
that established by international human rights law (IHRL). Under a
provision entitled ―Rights of Women, Youth, Children, and the Family in
the Muslim World,‖ the Program calls for ―strengthen[ing] laws aimed at
enhancing the advancement of women in Muslim societies . . . in
accordance with Islamic values of justice and equality.‖62 The provision
also urges ―adhering to the provisions of the Convention on the
Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women [CEDAW],
in line with the Islamic values of justice and equality.‖63
Although the document invokes CEDAW64 in framing women‘s
equality, making treaty compliance contingent on vague principles of
religious law undercuts the quest for women‘s equality. The international
60
61
62
63
64

OIC TEN YEAR PROGRAM, supra note 10, at introduction.
Id. at § 1(VIII)(1).
Id. at § 2(VI)(1).
Id.
U.N. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, 1979, 1249
U.N.T.S. 13 (Dec. 18, 1979) [hereinafter CEDAW].
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community—including OIC states—had been explicitly alerted to this
basic proposition almost a decade prior to adoption of the Ten Year
Program. In 2000, the UN Human Rights Committee (HR Committee)
concluded:
Inequality in the enjoyment of rights by women throughout the world
is deeply embedded in tradition, history and culture, including
religious attitudes. States parties should ensure that traditional,
historical, religious or cultural attitudes are not used to justify
violations of women‘s right to equality before the law and to equal
enjoyment of all . . . rights [under the ICCPR].65

Even before the HR Committee‘s statement, OIC states were on notice
that ill-defined religious norms represented unacceptable standards for
defining or enforcing women‘s equality. When certain OIC states
attached Shari‘ah-based reservations to their ratification of CEDAW,66
other state parties filed objections challenging the validity of invoking
religious law to limit application of the treaty. For example, in rejecting
Libya‘s CEDAW reservation, Norway argued that downgrading treaty
responsibilities
by invoking religious law (Shariah), which is subject to
interpretation, modification, and selective application in different
states adhering to Islamic principles, may create doubts about the
commitments of the reserving state to the object and purpose of the
Convention. It may also undermine the basis of international treaty
law.67

In 1998, the CEDAW Committee reached a similar conclusion regarding
the invalidity of Shari‘ah-contingent reservations. The Committee‘s
statement on reservations first recalled the deleterious effect of
reservations generally, commenting they impact the efficacy of the
treaty, prevent the Committee from assessing progress on
65

66

67

U.N. Human Rights Comm., CCPR General Comment No. 28: Article 3 (The Equality of Rights
Between Men and Women), U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.10, ¶ 5 (2000).
―The greatest proportion of substantive reservations to CEDAW has been entered by States
parties that cite Sharia (a) as a basis of all state law; or (b) as regulating matters of personal
status (marriage, divorce, custody, guardianship and adoption, inheritance).‖ Marsha A.
Freeman, Reservations to CEDAW: An Analysis for UNICEF, UNICEF 6 (Dec. 2009),
http://www.unicef.org/gender/files/Reservations_to_CEDAW-an_Analysis_for_UNICEF.pdf.
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, Declarations,
Reservation
and
Objections
to
CEDAW,
CEDAW
Sessions
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/reservations-country.htm#N38 (last visited Mar. 5,
2017) (Norway objecting to the reservation made by Libya on Jul. 16, 1990). Libya‘s reservation
provided that its ―[Accession] is subject to the general reservation that such accession cannot
conflict with the laws on personal status derived from the Islamic Shari‘ah.‖
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implementation, and potentially undermine the entire human rights
regime.68 The Committee then went further, observing:
Some States are concerned about a perceived conflict between article
2 [requiring measures to eliminate discrimination] and the Islamic
shariah law. In other instances, States have entered reservations,
which, although unspecific, are broad enough to encompass article 2.
These reservations pose an acute problem for the implementation of
the Convention and for the Committee‘s ability to monitor
compliance with it.69

Despite clear existing guidance from the HR Committee and
CEDAW Committee that Shari‘ah-based limitations are not a legitimate
justification for circumscribing women‘s equality, the OIC‘s Ten Year
Program plainly reasserts the intent to press forward with an
understanding of equality grounded in the same vague Islamic values.
For example, the Program calls for the OIC CFM ―to consider the
possibility of establishing an independent permanent body to promote
human rights in the Member States, in accordance with the provisions of
the [CDHRI].‖70 It likewise reaffirms the idea of establishing a parallel
―Islamic‖ rights regime by urging ―the elaboration of an OIC Charter for
Human Rights,‖ expediting development of ―‗[t]he Covenant on the
Rights of Women in Islam‘ in accordance with . . . the [CDHRI],‖71 and
―encourag[ing] Member States to sign and ratify the OIC Covenant on
the Rights of the Child in Islam.‖72
The move to integrate references to nascent OIC ―covenants‖ in
the Ten Year Program reconfirms the organization‘s desire to build upon
the CDHRI‘s declaratory nature and translate its principles into legally
binding human rights instruments intended to regulate member state
behavior in accordance with Islamic norms. This position is elaborated in
OIC Resolution No. 60/27-P On the Follow-Up of the Cairo Declaration
on Human Rights in Islam, adopted in June 2000, which recognizes,

68
69

70
71
72

U.N. GAOR, 19th Sess., UN Doc. A/53/38/Rev.1 (Jul. 10, 1998).
Id. Committee concluding observations for individual state parties with Shari‘ah-based
reservations reinforce the incompatibility of such measures with CEDAW. For example, the
Committee‘s conclusions for Bahrain observe that ―[Shari‘ah] reservations are contrary to the
object and purpose of the Convention. . .The Committee strongly encourages the State party
to. . .take all necessary steps for the withdrawal of all its reservations to the Convention so as to
ensure that women in Bahrain benefit from all the provisions enshrined in the Convention.‖ UN
Doc. CEDAW/C/BHR/CO/2, ¶¶15-16 (Nov. 7, 2008).
OIC TEN YEAR PROGRAM, supra note 10, at § 1(VIII)(2).
Id. at § 2(VI)(3).
Id. at § 2(VI)(6).
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among other things, ―the importance of following up the [CDHRI] and
calls upon the Governmental Expert Group . . . to start the formulation
and consideration of Islamic charters on human rights . . . each of which
shall deal with one or several issues in detail based on the provisions of
the [CDHRI].‖73
This ongoing effort to shift from aspirational to binding norms—
reinvigorated with the Ten Year Program‘s call for ―elaborating an OIC
Charter for Human Rights‖74—is further demonstrated by the OIC‘s 2004
endorsement of a standalone Covenant on the Rights of the Child in
Islam (CRCI).75 The CRCI mirrors the UN Convention on the Rights of
Child (UNCRC)76 in a number of ways. For example, the CRCI details
numerous rights relating to children and calls for establishing a
committee to monitor the progress of member states in implementing the
treaty.77 Beyond these similarities, the CRCI‘s departure point and
framing of rights is decidedly different. The document affirms ―the
Dhaka Declaration on Human Rights in Islam . . . and the Cairo
Declaration on Human Rights in Islam,‖78 and then proceeds to: (1)
situate Shari‘ah and domestic law above any international norms relating
to children‘s rights;79 (2) prohibit any form of expression that contradicts
Shari‘ah;80 (3) prohibit forms of dress deemed incompatible with
Shari‘ah;81 (4) permit parents ―to exercise Islamic and humane
supervision over the conduct of the child‖82; and (5) obligate states to bar

73

74
75

76

77
78
79
80
81
82

OIC, Resolution No. 60/27-P On the Follow-Up of the Cairo Declaration On Human Rights in
Islam, the Twenty-seventh Session of the Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers (Session of
Islam and Globalization), Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, art. 2 (Jun. 27-30, 2000).
OIC TEN YEAR PROGRAM, supra note 10, § 1(VIII)(2).
Covenant on the Rights of the Child in Islam, OIC Doc. OIC/9-IGGE/HRI/2004/Rep.Final
[hereinafter CRCI].
UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25 (Nov. 20, 1989) [hereinafter
UNCRC].
CRCI, supra note 75, at art. 24(1).
Id. at preamble.
Id. at art. 3(1).
Id. at art. 9(1).
Id. at art. 12(2)(iv).
Id. at art. 9(2)(iv). This provision seemingly makes allowance for the corporal punishment of
minors despite the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child decisively rejecting such a
possibility under the UNCRC. According to the Committee, a ―clear and unconditional
prohibition of all corporal punishment‖ is required, and such a prohibition also precludes faithbased justifications: ―practice of a religion or belief must be consistent with respect for others‘
human dignity and physical integrity. Freedom to practise one‘s religion or belief may be
legitimately limited in order to protect the fundamental rights and freedoms of others.‖ Comm.
on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 8 (2006): The Right of the Child to Protection
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―[c]ultural, ideological, information and communication invasion which
contradicts the Islamic Shari‘a[h].‖83
Overarching these concerning provisions, the broad drafting of
CRCI article 1 suggests that the covenant purports to apply its religious
precepts to all children living within the state, irrespective of their
parents‘ or the child‘s own religious belief.84 Perhaps in part because of
these concerns, by the end of 2013 only eight states had signed the
convention, and only one—Gambia—deposited its instrument of
ratification.85 Nevertheless, the OIC continues to prop up the CRCI as
good law. For example, the 2012 Islamic Conference of Ministers in
Charge of Childhood called on Member States ―to implement the [CRCI]
through enacting laws, devising policies and programmes for better and
rapid development of early childhood in the Islamic world, and
highlighting the Islamic perspective in such policies and programmes.‖86
During a 2016 UN meeting on the rights of the child, the OIC boasted
that it
attaches great importance to the promotion and protection of the
rights of the child. . . . Article 17 of the Covenant on the Rights of the
Child in Islam . . . invites States Parties to take necessary measures to
protect the child from all forms of abuse and particularly sexual
abuse.87

In addition, in 2016, the OIC Islamic Summit‘s Final Communique
―called on Member States to expedite the signing and ratification of the

83
84

85

86

87

from Corporal Punishment and Other Cruel or Degrading forms of Punishment (arts. 19; 28,
para. 2; and 37, inter alia), ¶¶ 29, 39, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/GC/8 (Mar. 2, 2007).
CRCI, supra note 75, at art. 17(4).
Art. 1 provides: ―For the purposes of the present Covenant, a child means every human being
who, according to the law applicable to him/her, has not attained maturity.‖ Id. at art. 1.
However, the CRCI also allows for member states to extend lesser protections to refugee
children. Id. at art. 21.
Rep. of the Secretary General on Legal Affairs, submitted to the 40th Session of the Council of
Foreign Ministers, OIC Doc. OIC/CFM-40/2013/LEG/SG-REP, Annex, ¶¶ (R), (S) (Dec.2013).
Third Islamic Conference of Ministers In Charge of Childhood, Reinforcing Development:
Meeting the Challenge of Early Childhood Promotion in the Islamic World” ¶ 11, Res. ICMCC3/2011/R.2.2 (Feb. 10–11, 2011) (The conference‘s final outcome document, the ―Tripoli
Declaration on Accelerating Early Childhood Development in the Islamic World‖, likewise
reaffirmed ―the CRCI, the Declaration on the Rights and Care of the Child in Islam. . . [and] the
international Convention on the Rights of the Child.‖).
OIC Delegation Statement during the Annual full-day meeting on the rights of the child
―Information and communications technology and child sexual exploitation‖ (Afternoon panel:
Combating and preventing child sexual exploitation through ICTs- Role of ICTs, multistakeholders
approach
and
good
practices)
(Mar.
7,
2016),
https://extranet.ohchr.org/sites/hrc/HRCSessions/RegularSessions/31stSession/OralStatements/2
7_OIC_Panel_mtg_19.pdf.
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Covenant of the Rights of the Child in Islam.‖88 From the OIC‘s
perspective, therefore, the CRCI continues to embody a valid expression
of desired human rights norms despite the fact that the covenant‘s
substance diminishes international protections and perpetuates many of
the same shortcomings embodied in the CDHRI.
Although the OIC succeeded in drafting and opening the CRCI
for signature and ratification, it has achieved significantly less progress
to date on the ―Covenant on the Rights of Women in Islam‖ (CRWI).
The Ten Year Program calls for expediting the CRWI‘s development,89
but this particular covenant remains—to borrow a computer industry
term—vaporware. Still, despite these apparent setbacks, the OIC
continued to reiterate that member states support the ratification (and
drafting, in the case of the CRWI) of both treaties throughout the
duration of the Ten Year Program. Most recently for example, in two
separate resolutions issued following the 2015 CFM session, the OIC
once again appealed to member states to sign and ratify the CRCI ―as
soon as possible‖90 and reiterated the ―urgent need to adopt‖ the CRWI.91
B. OLD WINE, NEW BOTTLE? A NEW ORGANIZATIONAL CHARTER AND
A REBRANDED OIC
In addition to charting increased engagement with human rights
(at least in some form), the OIC‘s Ten Year Program also called for
restructuring the organization, changing its name, and revising its
Charter and activities.92 In 2008, the organization formally adopted its
new institutional Charter.93 This document carries over much from its

88
89
90

91

92

93

O.I.C. Doc. OIC/13TH SUMMIT 2016/FC/FINAL, supra note 14, at ¶ 194.
OIC TEN YEAR PROGRAM, supra note 10, § 2(VI)(3).
Council of Foreign Ministers Res. 1/42-LEG, On Follow-Up and Coordination of Action in the
Field of Human Rights, ¶ 19, OIC Doc. OIC/CFM-42/2015/LEG/RES/FINAL (May 27–28,
2014); see also Council of Foreign Ministers Res. 1/41-LEG, On the Follow-Up and
Coordination of Work in the Field of Human Rights, ¶ 18, OIC Doc. OIC/CFM41/2014/LEG/RES/FINAL (June 18–19, 2014).
Council of Foreign Ministers Res. 4/42-C, On Social and Family Issues, ¶ B(10), O.I.C. Doc.
OIC/CFM-42/2015/CS/RES/FINAL (May 27–28, 2015). The OIC passed similar resolutions in
2014 and 2013. See Council of Foreign Ministers Res. 4/41-C, On Social and Family Issues, ¶
A(10), OIC Doc. OIC/CFM-41/2014/CSF/RES/ (Jun. 18–19, 2014); see also Council of Foreign
Ministers Res. 4/40-C, On Social and Family Issues, ¶ A(10), OIC Doc. OIC/40CFM/2013/CS/RES/FINAL (Dec. 9–11, 2013).
The organization changed its name from ―Organization of the Islamic Conference‖ to
―Organization of Islamic Cooperation.‖ OIC TEN YEAR PROGRAM, supra note 10, § 1(XI)(1).
2008 OIC Charter, supra note 6.
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1972 predecessor but in certain respects arguably goes further to
acknowledge and incorporate human rights language. The 2008 Charter
arguably also represents a breakthrough in legitimacy and
representativeness for the organization. As then OIC Secretary General
Ihsanoglu reported to the CFM in 2010:
I am pleased to inform your august gathering that the OIC new
Charter . . . has now been signed by 39 States and ratified by 14.
Whereas the Old Charter did not get more than 23 signatures over its
40 years of existence. This is an indicator of the Member States‘
increased interest in their organization and their belief in its
credibility and its being worthy of their service.94

On equality, the 2008 Charter retains its overriding
preoccupation with member state equality rather than acknowledging
equality as a human right ascribed to individuals.95 Still, for the first time
the new document‘s preamble does reference a general determination to
―preserve and promote the lofty Islamic values of peace, compassion,
tolerance, equality, justice and human dignity.‖96 In addition, the 2008
Charter also establishes new core objectives for the OIC that were
previously outside of its formal mandate. These objectives include:
12. To protect and defend the true image of Islam, to combat
defamation of Islam and encourage dialogue among civilisations and
religions;
....
14. To promote and to protect human rights and fundamental
freedoms including the rights of women, children, youth, elderly and
people with special needs as well as the preservation of Islamic
family values;
15. To emphasize, protect and promote the role of the family as the
natural and fundamental unit of society; [and]
16. To safeguard the rights, dignity and religious and cultural identity
of Muslim communities and minorities in non-Member States.97

The difficulty with these provisions is that they are not linked expressly
to any international human rights norm baseline. Other relevant Charter
provisions further aggravate this disconcerting reality. For example,

94
95
96
97

Ihsanoglu, supra note 24, at 11.
2008 OIC Charter, supra note 6, at arts. 2(2), 16.
Id. at preamble.
Id. at arts. 1(12), (14–16).
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article 2(7) calls upon member states to ―uphold and promote, at the
national and international levels, good governance, democracy, human
rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law.‖98 Yet, the Charter
fails to establish the precise standard that will be used to measure such
conduct. The preamble provides some direction here inasmuch as it links
the understanding of human rights norms to the constitutional and legal
systems of member states and likewise calls for promoting the ―rights of
women and their participation in all spheres of life, in accordance with
the laws and legislation of Member States.‖99 This guidance would
suggest that any definition of human rights obligations or limits is to be
linked to the member state‘s domestic legal framework rather than to
international law.
The fact that the OIC grants common domestic legislation
supremacy over international norms in the area of human rights is
intentional and cannot be considered mere oversight or default practice.
In several places elsewhere in the new Charter, the OIC exclusively
invokes international law as the baseline for establishing certain other
norms. For example, the Charter relies on international law to
authenticate the principles of non-interference in domestic affairs,100
sovereignty and territorial integrity,101 and the right of peoples to selfdetermination.102
Finally, the 2008 Charter advances the Ten Year Program‘s call
to establish an independent permanent human rights body for the OIC 103
by recognizing a new official OIC organ104—the Independent Permanent
Human Rights Commission (IPHRC)—and authorizing its mandate to
―promote the civil, political, social and economic rights enshrined in the
organisation‘s covenants and declarations [presumably including the
CDHRI] and in universally agreed human rights instruments, in
conformity with Islamic values.‖105 Despite its inclusion in the Charter,
the IPHRC effectively did not emerge until 2011, when member states
agreed to its operating statute.

98

Id. at art. 2(7).
Id. at preamble.
100
Id. at art. 2(5).
101
Id. at art. 1(4).
102
Id. at art. 1(7).
103
OIC TEN YEAR PROGRAM, supra note 10, at § 1(VIII)(2).
104
2008 OIC Charter, supra note 6, at art. 5.
105
Id. at art. 15.
99
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C. THE OIC‘S ―INDEPENDENT‖ PERMANENT HUMAN RIGHTS
COMMISSION
Three years after being approved in principle by the OIC‘s new
Charter, the 38th CFM Session in Kazakhstan officially gave life to the
OIC‘s human rights commission. Acting under Resolution 2/38-LEG, the
CFM adopted the IPHRC‘s statute and authorized the Commission to
commence its operations.106 According to then Secretary General
Ihsanoglu, this body would boost the OIC‘s international credibility and
help increase its confidence.107 In his view, the event was nothing short of
momentous, ―[i]t is only appropriate that a year marked by popular
uprising in different parts of the Muslim world against injustice,
corruption and abuse of power should conclude with the landmark
establishment of a Human Rights Commission duly equipped with a
progressive vision and mandate.‖108
A closer examination of the IPHRC‘s statute and the
Commission‘s activities to date, suggests a less progressive vision and
more inauspicious start for the meaningful advancement of equality and
nondiscrimination within the OIC system. To begin, the IPHRC statute
sets out that the Commission will be ―composed of 18 members
nominated by the Member States‘ governments among experts of
established distinction in the area of human rights.‖109 The statute also
requires Member States to ―encourage the nomination of women to the
membership of the Commission.‖110 Yet, despite this positive prompting,
elected commissioners to date demonstrate an inconsistent—and in some
cases non-existent—level of human rights expertise.111 Moreover, from
its outset, men have dominated the Commission, with only four of the

106

107

108
109
110

111

Council of Foreign Ministers Res. 2/38-LEG, OIC Doc. OIC/CFM-38/2011/LEG/RES/FINAL,
arts. 1-2 (Jun. 28–30, 2011).
Marie Juul Petersen, Islamic or Universal Human Rights? The OIC‘s Independent Permanent
Human Rights Commission, 3 DIIS REPORT 10 (2012).
Id. at 10.
OIC Doc. OIC/IPCHR/2010/STATUTE, art. 3 (2010) [hereinafter IPHRC Statute].
This language appears weak in comparison with the requirement provided in article 7 for
ensuring regional equity: ―In the election of the experts due consideration shall be given to
equitable geographical distribution among Member States.‖ Id. at arts. 6 & 7.
A listing of current commissioners and biographies is available on the IPHRC website. For
example, the biographies of Raihanah Abdullah and Abdul Wahab make no mention of human
rights. See About IPHRC, INDEP. PERMANENT HUMAN RIGHTS COMM‘N, http://www.oiciphrc.org/en/about/ (last visited Mar. 4, 2017).
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original eighteen appointed commissioners being women, and this level
of gender inequity continued into 2016.112
Beyond this failure to secure human rights expertise and gender
equality, the IPRHC statute is defective for two principal reasons. First, it
remains anchored to the CDHRI vision of rights, notwithstanding the
argument by some that it attempts to move beyond this OIC touchstone.
Second, despite its impressive title, the substance of the statute ensures
that the commission will be hobbled by a near total lack of
independence. These shortcomings give rise to serious questions about
the underlying purpose of the IPHRC and its mandate, and suggest the
commission will be used not to promote and protect universal human
rights within the OIC system, but rather to deflect international criticism
of its members and—particularly for the purposes of this article—to
amplify the OIC‘s effort to challenge any universal entrenchment of
international human rights norms, including equality and
nondiscrimination.
1. IPHRC Mandate Anchored to CDHRI Relativism
Although the IPHRC statute‘s preamble makes plain the
Commission‘s raison d‟être is grounded in the CDHRI,113 its operative
paragraphs omit any explicit reference to the Cairo Declaration.114 This
fact, coupled with the anonymous assurance of one IPHRC staffer that
―the Cairo Declaration is a declaration, the human rights commission is a
statutory commission—you decide what is most important,‖115 appears to
have led at least one observer to assert, ―there can be no doubt that the
Commission relies on a conception of human rights that is closer to the
UN Declaration on Human Rights.‖116 Substantiating such an important
pronouncement demands more rigorous investigation.
Despite the IPHRC statute‘s apparently nominal invocation of
the CDHRI, it remains shrouded in the Declaration‘s relativistic shadow,
112

113
114
115
116

Council of Foreign Ministers Res. 7/38-ORG, On the Election of Members of the OIC
Independent Permanent Human Rights Commission, arts. 1, OIC Doc. OIC/CFM38/2011/ORG/RES (Jun. 28–30, 2011).The original female IPHRC commissioners were: Ilham
Ibrahim Ahmed Mohamed (Sudan); Siti Ruhaini Dzuhayatin (Indonesia); Raihanah Abdullah
(Malaysia); and Asila Wardak (Afghanistan). These four commissioners have had their terms
renewed and continue to be the only female IPHRC members. About IPHRC, supra note 111.
IPHRC Statute, supra note 109, at preamble.
Id.
Petersen, supra note 107, at 29.
Id.
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where universal rights are conditioned on unspecified Islamic values. It
bears recalling that the statute‘s preambulatory language originates in the
2008 OIC Charter, which affirmatively requires that the Commission
promote the rights ―enshrined in the organisation‘s covenants and
declarations‖ (such as the CDHRI) and in universally agreed human
rights instruments, ―in conformity with Islamic values.‖117 The statute
therefore necessitates not only adoption of the CDHRI‘s baseline, but
effectively translates its declaratory aspirations into legal norms by
requiring the IPHRC to promote the rights as enshrined therein. This
formulation casts doubt on the argument that the Commission‘s starting
point for human rights is aligned with the international norms.
Furthermore, it renders hollow the IPHRC staffer‘s assurance that the
Commission‘s statutory status will somehow trump the CDHRI, since its
obligation to promote the CDHRI is equally blessed with the same
statutory authority.
The duty imposed by the 2008 Charter and the IPHRC statute
preamble further obligates the Commission to promote norms emerging
from the OIC‘s ongoing efforts to formulate a set of Islamic human
rights treaties. Presumably, this would include treaties such as the
envisioned CRWI and the already open to ratification CRCI. The latter
covenant ―[a]ffirm[s] the principles contained in . . . the [CDHRI]‖118 and
requires parties to ―respect the provisions of the Islamic Shari‘a, and
observe the domestic legislations of the Member States.‖119 This
affirmation—together with the fact that the CRCI omits any operative
reference to the UNCRC or other relevant international human rights
treaty—underscores the deeply problematic nature of legitimating such
instruments as authoritative human rights sources upon which the
IPHRC‘s work is to be based.
The CDHRI‘s disconnect from universal human rights norms is
rendered especially stark considering that the OIC‘s overarching
approach to constructing its Islamic human rights regime is premised on
a rejection of the pro homine principle governing the interpretation and
application of international human rights norms. Under the pro homine
principle, ―all human rights legal instruments and customary norms must
be interpreted and applied in the manner most protective of the human
117

118
119

Neither the Charter nor the IPCHR statute provide an explanation for the term ―Islamic values‖.
See 2008 OIC Charter, supra note 6, at art. 15; see also IPHRC Statute, supra note 109, at
preamble (emphasis added).
CRCI, supra note 75, at preamble.
Id. at art. 3(1).
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dignity of human beings, not the manner that is best for the state.‖120 As
such, where competing or conflicting standards of protection may arise,
states are required to uphold the maximum protection afforded to the
individual right at issue.121
Manifestations of the pro homine principle are evident across
key international human rights treaties. For example, Article 41 of the
UNCRC provides:
Nothing in the present Convention shall affect any provisions which
are more conducive to the realization of the rights of the child and
which may be contained in:
(a) The law of a State party; or
(b) International law in force for that State.122

Likewise, the ICCPR, under art. 5, provides:
Nothing in the present Covenant may be interpreted as implying for
any State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or
perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and
freedoms recognized herein or at their limitation to a greater extent
than is provided for in the present Covenant.
There shall be no restriction upon or derogation from any of the
fundamental human rights recognized or existing in any State Party to
the present Covenant pursuant to law, conventions, regulations or
custom on the pretext that the present Covenant does not recognize
such rights or that it recognizes them to a lesser extent.123

A variety of national constitutions124 and other regional human rights
treaties similarly prioritize the norm that most robustly protects

120

121

122
123
124

H. Victor Condé, A HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS TERMINOLOGY, 107 (2d ed.
2004) (definition for Hominum Causa Omne Jus Constitutum Est (Principle of Interpretation and
Application of Treaties) also known as the principle of Pro Homine). Condé defines the pro
homine principle as requiring ―international human rights norms [to] be interpreted and applied
in a way that most fully and adequately protects human beings. And where more than one human
rights norm or instrument applies to a particular situation, the one that gives the most protection
or freedom to the individual should prevail over those offering less.‖ Id. at 207.
ALLAN R. BREWER-CARÍAS, CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN LATIN
AMERICA: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF AMPARO PROCEEDINGS, 59 (2008) (observing ―in cases
involving various provisions, the one that should prevail is the one that contains the more
favorable regulation.‖).
UNCRC, supra note 76, at art. 41.
ICCPR, supra note 34, at art. 5.
For example, Mexico‘s constitution provides ―provisions relating to human rights shall be
interpreted according to this Constitution and the international treaties on the subject, working in
favor of the broader protection of people at all times.‖ Constitución Política de los Estados
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individual rights, further isolating the OIC‘s effort to give preference to
less protective domestic and religious law. For example, article 29 of the
American Convention of Human Rights provides that none of its
provisions shall be interpreted as:
a. [P]ermitting any State Party, group, or person to suppress the
enjoyment or exercise of the rights and freedoms recognized in this
Convention or to restrict them to a greater extent than is provided for
herein; [and]
b. [R]estricting the enjoyment or exercise of any right or freedom
recognized by virtue of the laws of any State Party or by virtue of
another convention to which one of the said states is a party;125

The European Union (EU) Charter of Fundamental Rights similarly
stipulates:
Nothing in this Charter shall be interpreted as restricting or adversely
affecting human rights and fundamental freedoms as recognised, in
their respective fields of application, by Union law and international
law and by international agreements to which the Union or all the
Member States are party, including the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, and by the
Member States‘ constitutions.126

Any lingering doubt over the nature of the IPHRC statute is put
to rest by examining OIC Resolution No. 1/38-Leg on Follow Up and
Coordination of Work on Human Rights.127 Passed alongside the IPHRC
statute in 2011, this resolution reaffirms the OIC‘s commitment to

125

126

127

Unidos Mexicanos [CPEUM], art. 1(2), Diario Oficial de la Federación [DOF] 1917, 2015
(Mex.); see also Víctor Manuel Collí Ek, Improving Human Rights in Mexico: Constitutional
Reforms, International Standards, and New Requirements for Judges, 20 HUMAN RIGHTS BRIEF
1, 3 (2012) (citing Id. ―Las normas relativas a los derechos humanos se interpretar n de
conformidad con esta Constitución y con los tratados internacionales de la materia favoreciendo
en todo momento a las personas la protección m s amplia.‖).
American Convention on Human Rights, art. 29, Nov. 21, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 143. See Valerio
de Oliveira Mazzuoli & Dilton Ribeiro, Indigenous Rights before the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights: A Call for a Pro Individual Interpretation, 4 RJLB 1707 (2015).
http://www.cidp.pt/publicacoes/revistas/rjlb/2015/4/2015_04_1707_1743.pdf (For a longer
treatment addressing the use of the pro homine principle by the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights). The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights similarly acknowledges that its work
is informed by ―the pro homine principle, whereby a law must be interpreted in the manner most
advantageous to the human being.‖ What is the IACHR?, INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON
HUMAN RIGHTS, http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/mandate/what.asp (last visited Mar. 9, 2017).
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, art. 53, Dec. 14, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 303)
1.
Council of Foreign Ministers Res. 1/38-LEG, On Follow Up and Coordination of Work on
Human Rights, OIC Doc. OIC/CFM-38/2011/LEG/RES/FINAL (Jun. 28-30, 2011).
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prioritizing Islamic human rights covenants and the continued centrality
of the CDHRI. The resolution‘s preamble posits that the promotion and
protection of human rights can occur only ―with due regard to the ‗Cairo
Declaration on Human Rights in Islam.‘‖128 It then proceeds to endorse
the ongoing ―formulation of a set of Islamic covenants on human rights‖
as a way ―to promote and protect human rights,‖129 and further on
promulgates ―the right of States to adhere to their religious, social, and
cultural specificities.‖130 This latter position stands in direct contravention
of the ―duty of States, regardless of their political, economic and cultural
systems, to promote and protect all human rights and fundamental
freedoms‖ established by the Vienna Declaration and Program of Action
(VDPA).131 As Francine Fournier has pointed out, restricting universal
human rights on the basis of religious specificities distorts the VDPA‘s
central intent. She states,
The mention of particularities and various historical, cultural and
religious backgrounds is sometimes interpreted as a sort of escape
clause, as an argument for the failure to comply with human rights
standards. This understanding . . . does not take into account . . . that
states are duty-bound—regardless of their political, economic and
cultural systems—to promote and protect all human rights. In line
with this formulation—and this is important—cultural specificities
should be taken into account in the promotion and protection of
human rights. They should help to determine the most effective ways
and means to overcome difficulties in the implementation of human
rights and fundamental freedoms.132

OIC Resolution 1/38-LEG does not end with mere rejection of the
possibility that universal human rights could trump specific religious
values. Rather, it goes on to advocate the ―non-use of the universality of
human rights as a pretext to interfere in the states‘ internal affairs and

128
129
130
131

132

Id. at preamble.
Id.
Id. at art. 4.
World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, §1(5), U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.157/23 (Jun 25, 1993) [hereinafter VDPA].
Francine Fournier, UNESCO and Human Rights, in PEACE, JUSTICE AND FREEDOM: HUMAN
RIGHTS CHALLENGES FOR THE NEW MILLENNIUM 383, 385 (Gurcharan Singh Bhatia et al. eds.,
2000). Human Rights Watch‘s 1994 conclusion on cultural relativism is equally apt here:
―suppressing freedom and equality in the name of culture or religion is a corruption of the
concept of rights. . .To view rights as varying with governmental interpretations of culture or
religion is to eviscerate the power of rights.‖ The Argument of Cultural Relativism, HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH WORLD REPORT 1994, https://www.hrw.org/reports/1994/WR94/Intro-03.htm
(last visited Mar. 9, 2017).
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diminish their national sovereignty.‖133 Thus, the OIC not only distorts
the compromise struck at the international level to uphold universal
human rights norms in the face of national and regional particularities
and historical, cultural and religious backgrounds (embodied in the
VDPA), but it also repudiates the legitimacy of external scrutiny of
domestic implementation of these norms.
This position contradicts longstanding international practice in the
area of universal human rights, which Nigel Rodley has traced back to
Sir Hersch Lauterpacht. As early as 1950, Lauterpacht ―argued that mere
discussion of a state‘s human rights performance was not precluded
under the [UN] Charter‘s non-intervention rule.‖134 Wider and more
concrete endorsement of this understanding has followed. For example,
in 1989 the Institute of International Law concluded that ―a State acting
in breach of its obligations in the sphere of human rights cannot evade its
international responsibility by claiming that such matters are essentially
within its domestic jurisdiction.‖135 Further, in the face of such breaches,
other states ―are entitled to take diplomatic, economic and other
measures towards [the violating] State . . . provided such measures are
permitted under international law. . . . These measures cannot be
considered an unlawful intervention in the internal affairs of that
State.‖136 Nearly twenty five years ago, OSCE participating states
―categorically and irrevocably declare[d] that the commitments
undertaken in the field of [human rights] are matters of direct and
legitimate concern to all participating States and do not belong

133

134

135

136

OIC Resolution No. 1/38-LEG, supra note 127, at art. 5. The CRCI mirrors this noninterventionist approach, providing that to ―achieve the objectives [of treaty] it is incumbent to . .
. . Observe non-interference in the internal affairs of any State.‖ CRCI, supra note 75, at art.
3(5).
Nigel Rodley, United Nations Human Rights Treaty Bodies and Special Procedures of the
Commission on Human Rights—Complementarity or Competition?, in TOWARDS IMPLEMENTING
UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS: FESTSCHRIFT FOR THE TWENTY-FIFTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE
HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE 3, 4–5 (Nisuke Andō ed., 2004). Jack Donnelly similarly rejects
what he labels a ―statist (or legalist)‖ view that ―an active concern for the human rights practices
of other states [is] inconsistent with the fundamental principle of state sovereignty.‖ According
to him, ―[i]llegitimate intervention occurs only when influence is exercised through strongly
coercive, essentially dictatorial means. So long as such means are avoided, statism provides no
ground for excluding human rights concerns from foreign policy.‖ Jack Donnelly, UNIVERSAL
HUMAN RIGHTS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE, 155, 158 (2003).
The Inst. of Int‘l Law, Resolution on the Protection of Human Rights and the Principle of Nonintervention in Internal Affairs of States, art. 2, (1989), http://www.idiiil.org/idiE/resolutionsE/1989_comp_03_en.PDF.
Id. at art. 2.
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exclusively to the internal affairs of the State concerned.‖137 Based on
this undertaking, fifty-six nations from Europe, Central Asia, and North
America committed themselves ―no longer . . . to invoke the nonintervention principle to avoid discussions about human rights problems
within their countries.‖138 As argued elsewhere, state parties to the
ICCPR and other major international human rights treaties similarly
recognize this basic premise by virtue of accepting the reporting
obligations that come with treaty ratification.139
2. Branding Effort Aside, IPHRC Statute Ensures Commission Will Be
Anything but Independent (or Pluralist)
The OIC had a variety of favorable human rights mechanisms to
consider in drafting the IPHRC‘s statute. Yet these potential models—
ranging from national human rights institutions (NHRIs) to other
regional mechanisms—appear to have made little impression on the
drafters. Although the Commission itself purports to follow
internationally recognized standards for ensuring ―objectivity,
independence and professionalism in the performance of its mandated
tasks,‖140 the IPHRC‘s founding statute makes plain the OIC‘s
determination to ensure that the human rights body remain dependent
upon OIC member states and limited to serving the OIC‘s political
objectives.
As discussed above, the statute‘s framing of human rights is
decidedly relativistic and risks disconnecting the Commission from the
universal norms set out on the international level. The statute is flawed in
137

138

139

140

Org. for Sec. & Co-operation in Eur. (OSCE), Document of the Moscow meeting of the
Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE, preamble (Oct. 4, 1991),
http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/14310?download=true.
OSCE Office for Democratic Insts. & Human Rights, OSCE HUMAN DIMENSION
COMMITMENTS:
A
REFERENCE
GUIDE,
xvi
(2001)
http://www.iskran.ru/cd_data/disk2/r3/015.pdf.
Blitt, supra note 15, at 171 Notably, only seven of the OIC‘s 57 member states have opted to
forgo ratification of the ICCPR: Brunei, Comoros, Malaysia, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the
United Arab Emirates. Ratification Status of ICCPR, U.N. TREATY COLLECTION,
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=IV4&chapter=4&clang=_en (last visited Mar. 5, 2017). Over 110 states have also ratified the
ICCPR‘s optional protocol recognizing the competence of the UN Human Rights Committee to
receive and consider human rights complaints filed by individuals directly. Ratification Status of
Optional
Protocol
to
the
ICCPR,
U.N.
TREATY
COLLECTION,
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=IV5&chapter=4&clang=_en (Last visited Mar. 5, 2017).
About IPHRC, supra note 111.
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other ways that similarly operate to downgrade the Commission‘s
legitimacy and ability to operate in any independent or constructive
manner. Among other things, the IPHRC statute ensures the Commission
will be reliant on member states and the OIC CFM in defining the scope
of its activities and executing its mandate. For example, article 12
requires that the Commission ―carry out consultative tasks for the
Council,‖ and article 13 obligates the Commission to ―support the OIC‘s
position on human rights at the international level‖ rather than serve as
an independent engine of individual rights monitoring and protection.
The IPHRC‘s mandate is further restricted under article 10,
which appears to authorize the Commission to conduct open-ended
monitoring ―of the human rights of Muslim communities and minorities‖
that are outside of OIC member states. Articles 14 and 17 reinforce this
reading insofar as they require that an OIC member state either authorize
consultation or request cooperation with the IPHRC before the
Commission can engage on internal human rights issues specific to that
member state.141 The effect of these articles reveals an untenable
hypocrisy. On one hand, the OIC seeks to perpetuate its core policy of
non-interference in the internal affairs of its own member states by
making IPHRC engagement contingent on member state permission. On
the other, it discards the pretense of such a norm as it might apply
outside of the OIC, by asserting the right to scrutinize non-OIC states
that are home to Muslim communities. Article 17 also operates to limit
the Commission‘s recommendation-making function as any proposals it
puts forward must be restricted to ―the OIC framework and in harmony
with Islamic values and agreed international standards.‖142
Finally, articles 20 and 21 of the IPHRC statute circumscribe the
Commission‘s autonomy in two key areas. First, its independent ability
to convene meetings is limited. The Commission is authorized to hold
two annual meetings and extraordinary meetings are permitted only if
requested by a member state or the Secretary General and approved by a
majority vote of the OIC.143 Second, its independent ability to call upon
expert testimony is similarly restricted. Participation of ―guests‖ in
IPHRC meetings, such as nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and
NHRIs, is contingent upon the approval of the Commission‘s host state,

141
142
143

IPHRC Statute, supra note 109, at arts. 14, 17.
Id. at art. 17.
Id. at art. 18.
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Saudi Arabia.144 Taken together, these provisions operate to divest the
Commission a priori of any functional independence from OIC states
and thereby render moot the question of whether individual IPHRC
commissioners may accurately be characterized as independent.145 Even
if a given commissioner or group of commissioners is genuinely
―independent,‖146 the effectiveness of that independence is critically
undermined by stripping the institution of the ability to call extraordinary
meetings or request testimony from interlocutors without advance OIC
approval.
The absence of functional independence is taken to the extreme
given the IPHRC statute‘s unusual requirement that the OIC secretary
general manage the task of hiring Commission staff, and a further
restriction that limits this hiring ability to a list of candidates preapproved by member states.147 This additional layer of oversight
underscores how committed the member states are to controlling all
facets of the Commission‘s work at every level. Relevant to this—and in
addition to the requirement that IPHRC Commissioners be Muslim—
OIC regulations restrict the Commission‘s staff to adherents of the
Muslim faith, despite the presence of significant and diverse non-Muslim
religious communities living within OIC member states.148
The IPHRC‘s bleak institutional framework and mandate are
rendered more disappointing when juxtaposed against practices
embraced by other national and regional human rights institutions. For
example, Canada‘s Human Rights Act establishes a Human Rights
Commission empowered to, inter alia:

144
145

146

147
148

Id. at art. 21.
See Press Release, FIDH, ASEAN: Actions of the AICHR‘s Current Chair Demonstrate Need for
AICHR‘s Terms of Reference to Ensure Independence and Impartiality of its Commissioners
(Mar.
30,
2015),
https://www.fidh.org/en/international-advocacy/other-regionalorganisations/asean/asean-actions-of-the-aichr-s-current-chair-demonstrate-need-for-aichr.
This assumption too is doubtful. Of the current eighteen serving IPHRC commissioners, at least
half are active representatives of member states‘ governments. About IPHRC, supra note 111.
IPHRC Statute, supra note 109, at art. 23.
For example, job postings on the IPHRC website stipulate under ―General Requirements‖ that
applicants must ―be a Muslim national of one of the OIC Member States.‖ At the time of writing,
two posts were available with the IPHRC, ―Research Analyst‖ and ―Protocol Officer‖; both
positions set out identical general requirements. This religious test corroborates reports the OIC
maintains ―an unwritten law that only Muslims from member countries are eligible for its jobs.‖
Ahsan, supra note 7, at 56. The issue of pluralism might also be raised within the narrower
confine of Islam to ask whether the Commission‘s composition genuinely represents all
Muslims, including minority sects from within Islam, as well as other Muslim dissenters and
nonbelievers.
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Consider requests and recommendations concerning human
rights and freedoms ―from any source‖;149



Review any parliamentary actions for consistency with
principles of equality and nondiscrimination;150 and



―[D]iscourage and reduce discriminatory practices‖ by
persuasion, publicity or other means.151
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To be certain, Canada‘s approach to designing and implementing its
human rights commission has not occurred in a vacuum. Much of its
substance is reflected in the Principles Relating to the Status of National
Institutions (Paris Principles), a set of authoritative guidelines endorsed
by the UN General Assembly in 1993.152 Although these principles do
not reflect binding legal obligations, they ―have been gradually
recognised at the international, regional and domestic levels to the extent
that they are now globally accepted criteria for NHRIs and are
permanently cited in recommendations and declarations encouraging
States to establish and strengthen such institutions.‖153
The OIC‘s rejection of the Paris Principles is clear and
consistent. With respect to purview, the Paris Principles recommend
national institutions ―be given as broad a mandate as possible‖154 to
promote and ensure ―harmonization of national legislation . . . with
international human rights instruments . . . and their effective
implementation.‖155 Yet, as discussed above, the IPHRC statute creates a
commission that operates contingent on member state permission, that
issues human rights recommendations disconnected from international
instruments, and that is left powerless with respect to the task of ensuring
effective implementation. Driving this point home, although apparently
proposed, drafters of the IPHRC statute opted to strike a provision that
would have empowered the Commission to ―investigate any possible

149
150
151
152

153
154
155

Canadian Human Rights Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. H-6, at art. 27(1)(e).
Id. at art. 27(1)(g).
Id. at art. 27(1)(h).
The first International Workshop on National Institutions for the Promotion and Protection of
Human Rights originally adopted the principles in October 1991. GAUTHIER DE BECO & RACHEL
MURRAY, A COMMENTARY ON THE PARIS PRINCIPLES ON NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
INSTITUTIONS, 3-4 (2015).
Id. at 18.
G.A. RES. 48/134, The Paris Principles, at 4 (Dec. 20, 1993).
Id. at 5.
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human rights violations by the OIC Member States [and] submit reports
thereon to the Council of Foreign Ministers for appropriate decision.‖156
The IPHRC statute similarly rejects the Paris Principles‘
guidelines for ensuring institutional autonomy from government. These
norms require human rights institutions to be free to ―consider any
questions falling within its competence,‖ including those submitted
―without referral to a higher authority, on the proposal of its members or
of any petitioner,‖ and to ―hear any person and obtain any information
and any documents necessary for assessing situations falling within its
competence.‖157 Despite this guidance, the IPHRC statute takes a
restrictive approach to autonomy, first by forcing the Commission to
approve ―guests‖ unanimously (essentially granting individual
commissioners veto power), and then by subjecting such ―guests‖ to a
second potential authorization veto by the Commission‘s host state,
Saudi Arabia.158
Finally, the Paris Principles place an understandable emphasis on
the independence and pluralism of the human rights institution. Thus,
composition of the institution should be afforded ―all necessary
guarantees to ensure the pluralist representation of the social forces (of
civilian society).‖159 Furthermore, the institution‘s members should be
empowered to ―meet on a regular basis and whenever necessary.‖160 As
demonstrated, IPHRC members are neither pluralist with respect to
gender or religious identity, nor are they truly independent of
government control.
Admittedly, at the time of its drafting the ambit of the Paris
Principles was envisioned as extending only to NHRIs. Yet, evidence
suggests that many of its norms have come to govern the practice of
human rights mechanisms operating on the regional level as well. For
example, confronted with the institutional shortcomings of ASEAN‘s
Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR), leading
human rights NGOs have argued,
In developing a transparent [commissioner] selection process . . .
ASEAN member states [should] look to the appointment practices of
other international bodies, as well as to the [Paris Principles] for
guidance. The Paris Principles affirm the importance of consultations

156

PETERSEN, supra note 107, at 18.
Paris Principles, supra note 154, at 3(b).
158
IPHRC Statute, supra note 109, at art. 21.
159
Paris Principles, supra note 154, at 1.
160
Id. at 3(d).
157
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with a broad variety of stakeholders, including civil society, as an
important element in ensuring an independent process. The same
principles should apply to a regional body such as AICHR. 161

The EU has echoed the view that the Paris Principles are applicable and
relevant to the formation of regional human rights mechanisms. For
example, it has ―encourage[d] ASEAN . . . to align the operations of the
AICHR in general adherence to the Paris principles, in order to protect
the human right of all individuals in ASEAN.‖162
The AICHR‘s failure to adopt the basic norms embodied under
the Paris Principles (and enshrined in other regional human rights
mechanisms, such as the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
and the African Commission on Human and People‘s Rights)163 may be
traced back to the body‘s terms of reference.164 Among other things, this
document establishes a substandard mandate for the human rights
commission that: (1) is merely consultative (as opposed to investigatory);
(2) prioritizes the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of
states; (3) weakens the independence of Commissioners by employing a
substandard appointment process; and (4) lacks ―a dedicated secretariat,
consisting of competent, impartial and independent members.‖165
Concerns over the AICHR‘s terms of reference make plain that
the commission will be unable to operate as an authoritative human
rights mechanism without significant changes to its mandate. More

161
162

163

164
165

FIDH, supra note 145.
Directorate-General for External Policies, The Role of Regional Human Rights Mechanisms,
DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR EXTERNAL POLICIES POLICY DEPARTMENT, 55 (Nov. 2010),
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2010/410206/EXPODROI_ET(2010)410206_EN.pdf.
For example, the African Commission ―may resort to any appropriate method of investigation; it
may hear from . . . any other person capable of enlightening it‖, and states are directed ―to submit
every two years . . . a report on the legislative or other measures taken, with a view to giving
effect to the rights and freedoms recognised and guaranteed by the present Charter.‖ Org. of
African Unity [OAU], African Charter on Human and Peoples‟ Rights, arts. 46, 62, OAU Doc.
CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5 (Jun. 27, 1981).
See ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights, Terms of Reference (2009).
Solidarity for Asian People‘s Advocacy Task Force on ASEAN & Human Rights [SAPA
TFAHR], Four Years On and Still Treading Water: A Report on the Performance of the ASEAN
Human Rights Mechanism in 2013 4 (Atnike N. Sigiro et al. eds., 2014), http://www.forumasia.org/uploads/publications/2014/November/@s-Isi%20Forum%20Asia%20Revisi.pdf. These
criticisms are mirrored in the academic literature. See, e.g., Carole J. Petersen, Bridging the
Gap? The Role of Regional and National Human Rights Institutions in the Asia Pacific, 13
ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL‘Y J. 174, 193 (2011) (concluding that the AICHR ―will not receive
individual complaints and it lacks any significant enforcement powers. Moreover, as an intergovernmental commission, the AICHR is not independent of the governments that established
it.‖).
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importantly for the purposes of this article, the AICHR‘s defects mirror
the problematic shortcomings set out above with respect to the IPHRC.
Even if one were to maintain that the Paris Principles ought not to be
applied to regional human rights mechanisms,166 additional evidence
indicates that many of the same basic principles are already recognized
and exist as standalone best practices or customary norms for regional
institutions. To this point, a ―non-paper‖ issued by the UN Office of the
High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) suggests that regional
human rights mechanisms should be ―composed of members who are
independent from government, and are impartial persons of integrity with
a recognised competence in the field of human rights.‖167 Further, these
mechanisms should be ―mandated to independently promote and protect
human rights‖168 in accordance with specific minimum powers and
responsibilities, including the ability to: (1) request human rights-related
information from a State Party; (2) carry out on-site visits to investigate
specific human rights concerns; (3) issue periodic progress reports; (4)
receive, investigate, analyze and decide on communications from any
individual, group of persons or NGO alleging human rights violation(s)
by a State Party; and (5) obtain ―all necessary information . . . with a
guarantee that the State Party will not engage in reprisals against those
persons providing information to the mechanism.‖169
Likewise, scholarship in this area confirms that regional human
rights commission mandates should incorporate many of the same
minimum norms already enshrined in the Paris Principles. For example,
Heyns and Killander posit that powers ascribed to regional mechanisms
should include:
1.

166

167

168
169

On-site visits to investigate and report on the human rights
situation in member states . . . .

For example, the ASEM Seminar on Human Rights (made up of 113 participants representing
governments and civil society across Asia and Europe) conceded that ―While the Paris Principles
may not be an appropriate model, there is value in exploring the development of minimum
international standards for regional human rights mechanisms.‖ Participants also concluded that
―The principle of non-interference with the internal affairs of states. . .is a real constraint to the
promotion and protection of human rights.‖ Seminar, National and Regional Human Rights
Mechanisms,
at
57
(Nov.
23–25,
2011),
http://www.asef.org/images/docs/11th%20Human%20Rights%20Publication_110612_v11%20c
omplete.pdf.
U.N. Office High Comm‘r Human Rights Reg‘l Office for S.E. Asia, Principles for Regional
Human Rights Mechanisms (Non-Paper), http://bangkok.ohchr.org/programme/asean/principlesregional-human-rights-mechanisms.aspx (last visited Mar. 9, 2017).
Id.
Id.
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2.

Appointment of independent special rapporteurs, working
groups etc as may be needed.

3.

Consideration and investigation of individual complaints in
respect of alleged human rights violations by member
states.

4.

Publication and dissemination of reports and decisions . . . .
Transparency should be the norm.

5.

Interaction with civil society organizations, national human
rights institutions and other international mechanisms with
a human rights agenda.170
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Measured against the Paris Principles and recognized best
practices applicable to regional human rights institutions, the IPHRC
statute falls far short.171 Rather than reflect a bona fide human rights
commission, the IPHRC is poised instead to be useful to OIC member
170

171

Christof Heyns & Magnus Killander, Toward Minimum Standards for Regional Human Rights
Systems, in LOOKING TO THE FUTURE: ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HONOR OF W.
MICHAEL REISMAN, 544–45 (Mahnoush H. Arsanjani et al. eds., 2011) [hereinafter Heyns &
Killander]. The authors suggest that ―Considering the multi-regional nature of the OIC, a limited
promotional mandate appears to be advisable with deference to regional human rights systems
where such exists and to the global system.‖ Id. at 551. As this article argues, the IPHRC may to
a limited extent do the former; but it falls flat on the latter. Heyns and Killander further observe
that: ―One of the complexities in developing a coherent regional human rights system under the
OIC. . .is the multi-regional nature of this IGO. In addition to the UN human rights instruments,
member states of the OIC are also party to the African Charter, the European Convention and the
American Convention. Conflicting decisions could arise if the OIC was to expand its monitoring
system.‖ Id. at 558. The specter of such conflicts should not serve to legitimate a human rights
mechanism that has the potential to undermine IHRL. In any case, such conflicts are not
particularly unusual, and can be overcome by ensuring respect for the pro homine principle
discussed above and the reasonable application of other legal tools such as the margin of
appreciation.
Indeed, the IPHRC appears to have more in common with the so-called ―International Human
Rights Commission,‖ the bizarre and self-serving creation of Mr. Muhammad Shahid Amin
Khan of Pakistan, a self-proclaimed ―World Chairman,‖ ambassador, and doctor. The
International Human Rights Commission, among other things, has defended the conduct of the
Assad regime of Syria, organized fraudulent beauty pageants in Lebanon, and, perhaps not
coincidentally, counts former OIC head Ihsanoglu as one of the ―co-presidents‖ of the
organization‘s ―Eminent Person‘s Council.‖ Mike Nagoya, Syria: IHRC Chief Ambassador Dr.
Muhammad
Shahid
Amin
Khan,
YOUTUBE
(Jan.
3,
2013),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Svp3Qa_kz0o (correcting the ―bad image‖ of the Syrian
regime on Syrian state television); Rafa Delfin, Fraud alert: Miss Universal Peace and
Humanity Organization, CRITICALBEAUTY.COM (Dec. 16, 2014, 8:15 p.m.),
http://www.criticalbeauty.com/2014/12/fraud-alert-miss-universal-peace-and.html; see also
Mazin Sidahmed, Fake group issuing diplomatic passports, THE DAILY STAR (Feb. 24, 2015,
12:10 AM), http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2015/Feb-24/288519-fake-groupissuing-diplomatic-passports.ashx (exposing fraudulent beauty pageant and allegations
concerning the issuing of fake diplomatic passports); see also Eminent Persons Council,
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION http://www.ihrchq.org/life-members/epc.php.
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states as a tool for reinforcing their own policy positions, while reflecting
many of the foreseeable shortcomings that flow from failure to comport
with recognized international standards, including, ineffectiveness,
―majoritarian tendencies,‖ insufficient inclusivity, and ―other gaps in
normative coverage and practical implementation.‖172 As Heyns and
Killander aptly sum up, ―the question has to be asked whether there are
indications that regional human rights mechanisms with certain features
rather than others will lean more to the side of being ‗protectors‘ or
‗pretenders.‘‖173 The IPHRC is not merely leaning to this latter side, but
has firmly entrenched its roots therein. And yet, this reality has not
prevented the UN General Assembly, as part of its resolution addressing
UN-OIC cooperation, from inviting ―increased cooperation and
exchanges‖174 between the IPHRC and the OHCHR, and as a
consequence, creating additional spaces for the OIC to insert its
corrosive take on equality and nondiscrimination into UN human rights
efforts.
III. PLAN INTO ACTION: RECENT MANIFESTATIONS OF THE OIC’S
VISION FOR EQUALITY AND NONDISCRIMINATION
The previous sections sketched the OIC‘s early engagement with
international human rights as well as more recent efforts to frame an
Islamic response to the elaboration of these norms within the
international system. Arguably, much of the impetus for the CDHRI, the
revised 2008 Charter and the IPHRC flowed from recognition that, since
the OIC‘s debut in the early 1970s, human rights have come to occupy an
increasingly significant and strategic arena for international
engagement,175 and that on this front, the organization lacked a coherent
and formal collective policy with which it could engage.176
172

173
174
175

176

Lyal S. Sunga, Head, Rule of Law Program, Improving Coordination Among NHRIs on
Discrimination: Considerations and Recommendations from a Comparative Perspective, 7th
session of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Elaboration of Complementary Standards (Jul. 21,
2015), http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Elaborationstandards/Session7/LyalSunga.pdf.
Heyns & Killander, supra note 170, at 530.
G.A. Res. 67/264, U.N. Doc. A/RES/67/264, at ¶ 7 (Aug. 16, 2013).
This is true for wielding human rights both as a sword, i.e. leveling allegations of rights
violations against other non-OIC states, and as a shield, i.e. arguing that a rights violation
directed at an OIC member state is unjustified based on being either overbroad or not universally
recognized.
For example, the preamble of OIC Resolution 40/21-P On the Cairo Declaration on Human
Rights in Islam ―Recogniz[ed] the utmost importance of the issue of human rights in
international relations and in particular in relations among the OIC Member States, resulting
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Arguably, being perceived as accepting the validity of human
rights norms—even if in rhetoric only—better positions a state to exert
its views on the international debate over the substance of these rights.
Yet, no matter how laudable the OIC‘s apparent willingness to recognize
an increasingly rights-centric zeitgeist, the foundation for its actual
engagement rests squarely on rejection of the universality principle
undergirding the entire international human rights framework. Indeed,
the primary function of the OIC‘s approach to rights engagement is
premised on advocating and implementing an alternate vision that
upends universality in favor of ―religious, social, and cultural
idiosyncrasies.‖177
OIC Secretary General Madani‘s statement to the opening of the
IPHRC‘s Fourth Session embodies this approach. According to Madani,
the ―OIC takes pride in the fact that Islam was the first religion that laid
down universal fundamental rights for humanity, which are to be
observed and respected in all circumstances. Most OIC countries have,
therefore, willingly adopted and implemented international human rights
norms.‖178 Yet at the same time, the Secretary General cautioned, ―there
are a number of issues that go beyond the normal scope of human rights
and clash with Islamic teachings.‖179 In his assessment, these issues arise
in the contexts of gender equality, freedom of expression, and domestic
application and enforcement of human rights norms.180
The Secretary General‘s framing confirms that the OIC
recognizes the centrality of human rights norms, even possibly their
universality. This recognition, however, is conditioned on one
overarching limitation: if a recognized or asserted right does not comport
with the OIC‘s unspecified understanding of Islam, it falls outside the
―normal scope‖ of universal human rights and presumably is not entitled
from the current developments and interactions in the international arena‖ and expressed
awareness ―of the direct implications of this matter on the speedy achievement of development,
progress and stability in various economic, social and political fields.‖ Org. of Islamic
Cooperation [OIC], Res. 40/21-P, Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam, preamble (Apr.
25–29, 1993).
177
OIC Res. 1/41-LEG, supra note 90, at art. 4.
178
Madani, supra note 59.
179
Id.
180
Id. Puzzlingly, the secretary general omits reference to the right of freedom of thought,
conscience and religion or belief as an area where the OIC diverges from the ―normal scope‖ of
IHRL. See Blitt, supra note 15, at 155 (arguing ―A closer look at the OIC‘s advocacy favoring a
ban on defamation of religion reveals an approach that embodies not one but several anticonstitutional ideas that operate to foreclose the principles of nondiscrimination and equality and
undercut universal rights to freedom of expression and freedom of religion or belief.‖).
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to protection. In practice, discounting rights on this vague basis has the
effect of front-ending protection of religious belief at the expense of
upholding international law. This approach not only risks exposing
potentially vulnerable individuals and groups to harm, but it facilitates
that harm by enabling governments to circumvent even the need to
justify policies and practices that violate the right at issue.
To better understand how deleterious this approach can be to
individual rights and to the overall stability and universality of the
international human rights framework, it is useful to consider it in the
context of actual practice. Accordingly, the following section explores
the OIC‘s position on ―gender equality‖—one area highlighted by the
OIC as going ―beyond the normal scope of human rights and clash[ing]
with Islamic teachings‖181—to illustrate how the organization‘s framing
of equality and nondiscrimination undermines protection for all human
beings and risks attenuating the promise of the UDHR and related
international norms. Given that the IPHRC reflects the OIC‘s most recent
and high profile effort to engage with the substance of human rights, its
endeavors will also be considered alongside those of the OIC to help
gauge the extent to which it may or may not be incubating or
encouraging an alternate interpretation of equality.
A. WOMEN‘S RIGHTS
Madani‘s remarks to the IPHRC appear to indicate that the
OIC‘s sole concern regarding gender equality flows from the perception
that ―Western countries push for the term Gender [to go] beyond the
normal definition of men and woman into the direction of how one
perceives him/herself rather than his/her actual physical appearance.‖182
In reality, this framing conceals a broader OIC disagreement that
encompasses the scope and substance of women‘s rights as well.
Therefore, before engaging with the question of equality as it relates to
gender identity and sexual orientation,183 it is critical to take stock of the
181
182
183

Madani, supra note 59.
Id.
The Yogyakarta Principles provide helpful definitions here: ―Gender identity is understood to
refer to each person‘s deeply felt internal and individual experience of gender, which may or
may not correspond with the sex assigned at birth, including the personal sense of the
body. . .and other expressions of gender, including dress, speech and mannerisms.‖ ―Sexual
orientation is understood to refer to each person‘s capacity for profound emotional, affectional
and sexual attraction to, and intimate and sexual relations with, individuals of a different gender
or the same gender or more than one gender.‖ THE YOGYAKARTA PRINCIPLES: PRINCIPLES ON
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OIC‘s unease with the concept of women‘s rights and consider how it
conflicts with international protection of equality and nondiscrimination.
Recent data relating to the status of women in OIC states
provides a helpful starting point for assessing the OIC‘s approach to
women‘s rights and framing the scope of the problem. According to a
2015 report released by the Statistical, Economic and Social Research
and Training Centre for Islamic Countries (SESRIC),184 ―the average
gender equality index scores in 2013 reveal that the OIC group has the
lowest gender equality index score compared with all three country
groups (non-OIC developing, developed and world).‖185 In other words,
the OIC as a collective of states ranks lowest in terms of gender
equality.186 Based on SESRIC‘s findings, one of the principal reasons for
this inequality is limited participation of women in the decision-making
process. For example, globally, women on average account for 28.8
percent of legislators, senior officials, and managers.187 This
representation level actually increases to 33.1 percent when considering
only non-OIC developing countries.188 In contrast, when singling out OIC
states, representation of women within this professional class plummets
to 15.6 percent, or less than half of the level achieved by the rest of the
developing world.189
Other statistics are equally disconcerting. OIC states maintained
the lowest labor force participation rate (LFPR) for women in the world,
trailing the global average by nearly 15 percent.190 Further, while literacy
rates in OIC states overall are ―not impressive,‖ according to SESRIC,
when viewed ―from a gender disparity perspective‖ they show ―even a
less optimistic picture,‖ with only 64.2 percent of women able to read

THE APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL
ORIENTATION
AND
GENDER
184
185

186
187
188
189
190

HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN RELATION TO SEXUAL
IDENTITY
6
(Mar.
2007),
http://www.yogyakartaprinciples.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/principles_en.pdf.
SESRIC is a subsidiary body of the OIC.
According to SESRIC, the gender equality index is a ―globally recognized comprehensive
[index]. . .of the CIVICUS Foundation.‖ Statistical, Econ. & Soc. Research & Training Ctr. for
Islamic Countries [SESRIC], Org. of Islamic Cooperation [OIC], State of Gender and Family
Well-Being in OIC Member Countries 3 (2015), http://www.sesrtcic.org/publicationsdetail.php?id=339.
Id.
Id. at 41–42.
Id. at 5.
Id.
Id. at 32. The LFPR is a ―critical indicator used to assess women‘s participation in economic
life.‖ Id. at 31.
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and write.191 Exacerbating limited education, employment, and
advancement prospects, approximately 130,000 women in the OIC states
―died from preventable causes related to pregnancy and childbirth in
2013, corresponding to 44% of world total maternal deaths,‖192 a statistic
the OIC Secretary General lamented as ―deeply regrettable.‖193
1. OIC Plan of Action for the Advancement of Women (OPAAW)
To be clear, the OIC is cognizant of these profoundly disturbing
development trends. The 2008 OIC Plan of Action for the Advancement
of Women (OPAAW)194 followed on the heels of the new OIC Charter
and marked the first concerted effort by the organization to engage with
the issue of discrimination against women. The document‘s preamble
acknowledges, ―women today suffer exclusion and marginalization and
face difficulties that impede their participation in social life and other
areas.‖195 It then proceeds to attribute these problems to behaviors that
―emanate from non-Islamic norms and practices as well as
misunderstanding of religion.‖196
At the same time, the OPAAW premises women‘s rights on a
grant from Islam,197 qualifies any state party adherence to CEDAW
provisions ―in line with Islamic values of justice and equality,‖198 and
reiterates support for drafting the CRWI ―in accordance with . . . the
Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam.‖199 The OPAAW further
endorses the development of women ―based on social justice, distinctive
consideration of women, female education, health and promoting
economic activities. . .guided by the lofty teachings of Islam‖ and calls
for women to ―be respected, developed, empowered, considered full

191

192
193
194

195
196
197
198
199

Id. at 10. Secretary General Madani acknowledged this literacy deficit was ―significantly
regressive‖. Iyad Ameen Madani, Org. of Islamic Cooperation Sec‘y Gen., Statement during
debate on ―Impact of Women Empowerment on the Sustainable Development of Member States‖
at the Ninth Regular Session of the IPHRC (May 4, 2016).
OIC Doc. OIC/13TH SUMMIT 2016/FC/FINAL, supra note 14, ¶ 150.
Madani, supra note 191.
Second Ministerial Conference on ―Women‘s Role in the Development of OIC Member States,‖
OIC Plan of Action for the Advancement of Women [OPAAW], OIC Doc. OIC/2-WCOD/2008(OPAAW) (Nov. 24-25, 2008) [hereinafter OPAAW].
Id. at ¶ 3.
Id.
Id. at ¶ 6.
Id. at ¶ 8.
Id. at art. I(1).
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active participants in social, political, cultural and economic spheres,
enjoying their rights and fulfilling their duties.‖200
In sum, while the OPAAW does recognize the challenge
discriminatory customs and traditions may pose in achieving women‘s
equality, the Plan‘s very definition of equality is made contingent on
undefined religious norms that emphasize a separate role for women that
is distinct and different from men and that comes with its own set of
rights and duties rather than the same rights and duties. Accordingly, the
laudable goal of ―achieving gender equality and empowerment of women
at all levels and all sectors‖201 must be understood in its peculiar context,
namely a vision of equality that perpetuates the problematic formulation
of rights set forth under the CDHRI. While this understanding may help
to account for why CEDAW has ―the largest number of general and
specific reservations, based on [Shari‘ah] law,‖202 the OIC‘s distinction
and separation based on gender nevertheless remains antithetical to the
Convention‘s call for ―the full development and advancement of women,
for the purpose of guaranteeing them the exercise and enjoyment of
human rights and fundamental freedoms on a basis of equality with
men.‖203
The OIC‘s effort to establish an action plan for women premised
on discriminatory treatment similarly contradicts CEDAW‘s antidiscrimination safeguards, which require state parties, ―to take all
appropriate measures, including legislation, to modify or abolish existing
laws, regulations, customs and practices which constitute discrimination
against women,‖204 including those ―based on the idea of the inferiority
or the superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men
and women.‖205 As the UN Working Group on the Issue of
Discrimination Against Women in Law and in Practice (UN Working
Group on Discrimination Against Women) has summarized:
Several United Nations human rights experts, special procedures
mandate holders, treaty bodies and the Secretary-General of the
United Nations have established that neither cultural diversity nor
freedom of religion may justify discrimination against women.

200
201
202
203
204
205

Id. at 2 (emphasis added).
Id. at 2–3.
CISMAS, supra note 2, at 266.
CEDAW, supra note 64, at art. 3.
Id. at art. 2(f).
Human Rights Council, Report of the Working Group on the Issue of Discrimination Against
Women in Law and in Practice, ¶ 15, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/29/40, ¶ 15 (Apr. 2, 2015).
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Discriminatory, repressive and violent practices against women
should be eliminated, whatever their origins, including those founded
in culture or religion. The Working Group is convinced that this
opinion is crucial to securing women‘s enjoyment of their right to
equality in all aspects of life.206

From the perspective of the UN Working Group on Discrimination
Against Women, therefore, the OPAAW would appear to perpetuate the
same justifications international human rights law has been tasked with
denying. Additional aspects of OPAAW discussed below reinforce the
OIC‘s effort to validate women‘s inequality on the basis of religious
norms.
2. OIC Organization of Women Development (WDO)
The OPAAW also calls for establishing a new OIC subsidiary
organ to ―address the role of women in the development of OIC Member
States‘ societies.‖207 To this end, in May 2010 the OIC‘s Council of
Foreign Ministers adopted a statute for the OIC Organization of Women
Development (WDO).208 Among other things, the WDO is envisioned as
overseeing ―the development and promotion of the role of women in the
OIC Member States . . . in line with the principles of the Islamic
values,‖209 by ―implement[ing] the OIC‘s resolutions and
recommendations in the areas of its work.‖210
According to the statute, the WDO‘s specific objectives include:
1. Highlight[ing] the role of Islam in preserving the rights of the
Muslim woman especially at the international fora in which the
Organization is involved; . . . [and]

206
207
208

209

210

Id. at ¶ 17.
OPAAW, supra note 194, at 9.
Council of Foreign Ministers, Res. 2/37, On the Establishment of a Specialized Organization for
Women Development in OIC Member States, OIC Doc. OIC/CFM-37/2010/ORG/RES/FINAL
(May 18–20, 2010).
Organization of Islamic Cooperation [OIC], Statute of the OIC Women Development
Organization, OIC Doc. OIC/EGM-2009/DS-WDO/REP/FINAL, at art. 2, http://www.oicoci.org/english/convenion/Statue_of_the_oic_women_development_org_en.pdf
[hereinafter
WDO Statute]. Of note, the draft statute originally called for these activities to be ―in line with
the principles of the Islamic Sharia.‖ OIC, Res. 4/36-ORG, On the Establishment of a
Specialized Organization for Women Development In OIC Member States, OIC Doc. OIC/CFM36/2009/ORG/RES/FINAL (May 23–25, 2009), at art. 2.
WDO Statute, supra note 209, at art. 3.
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8. Activat[ing] the rights of women enshrined in the OIC Charter by
working to remove the restrictions that will enable women to
participate in community building.211

Based on this formulation, if the WDO does in fact materialize, it is quite
likely to reflect the OIC‘s priorities—namely, ensuring Islamic values
curtail any undesirable or ―abnormal‖ interpretation of the scope of
women‘s rights—rather than promote universal women‘s rights equally
and without discrimination. It is worth recalling here that the OIC‘s 2008
Charter had little to offer in support of women‘s rights. In the first
instance, the Charter lumps protection of women‘s rights together with
―children, youth, elderly and people with special needs as well as the
preservation of Islamic family values‖ as the fourteenth of twenty stated
organizational objectives.212 In addition, the Charter‘s preamble explicitly
rejects the possibility of international human rights norms informing
women‘s rights, and instead determines the OIC will ―safeguard and
promote the rights of women and their participation in all spheres of life,
in accordance with the laws and legislation of Member States.‖213 In
other words, invoking the OIC Charter as the touchstone for activating
women‘s rights promises the perpetuation rather than the elimination of
gender inequality and discrimination.
Despite the passing of six years and continued OIC calls on
member states to act,214 the WDO statute remains unratified and the body
itself mere illusion.215 For the purposes of this article, however, the
OPAAW and WDO serve to illustrate a larger fundamental point. That
is, the OIC‘s approach to women‘s rights remains fixated on entrenching
its own particularized understanding of Islamic norms and obstructing
the promise of full and equal rights and freedoms for women without
distinction of any kind, as set forth under the international human rights

211
212
213

214

215

Id. at arts. 5(1), (8).
2008 OIC Charter, supra note 6, at art. 1.
It is difficult to construe this proviso as anything other than a limitation on the applicability of
international law in the realm of women‘s rights. Id. at 2.
For example, the 42nd Session of the Council of Foreign Ministers ―Call[ed] on the Member
States to sign and ratify the statute of the specialized Organization for Women Development,
based in Cairo with the view to operationalize it.‖ OIC Resolution No. 4/42-C On Social and
Family Issues, supra note 91, at ¶ B(14).
The statute requires fifteen ratifications to enter into force. WDO Statute, supra note 209, at art.
12. According to the OIC, ―So far, only eighteen (18) Member States signed the Statute and three
(3) ratified it.‖ SG Report on Legal Affairs (40 th CFM), supra note 85, at ¶ N. Member states that
have ratified the WDO statute are: Gabon, Pakistan, and The Gambia. Id. at ¶ Z. States that have
signed are: Egypt, Mali, United Arab Emirates, Djibouti, Comoros, Benin, Niger, Mauritania,
Indonesia, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Guinea, Chad, Kuwait, and Palestine. Id. at ¶ Y.
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framework. This policy is confirmed by the organization‘s a priori
foreclosure of critical debate surrounding the parameters of these
freedoms, even within the framework of bona fide Islamic sources.
Revealingly, the OIC‘s Mechanism for Implementation of the OPAAW
purports to permit ―OIC Member States, Muslim civil society
organizations, communities and the media‖ to encourage and fund public
debate on the issue of women‘s rights, but only when that debate reflects
positively on the rights of women in Islam.216 It is also reinforced by
continued invocation of the CDHRI—at the expense of other
international texts217—as a valid departure point for defining the scope of
women‘s rights, and by ongoing calls to adopt the CRWI, 218 the
substance of which likely would only further undermine the universal
objective of achieving women‘s equality in all areas.219
3. IPHRC on Women‟s Equality
For its part, the IPHRC has exhibited a steady endorsement of
the restrictive approach to women‘s equality, with little indication of
discomfort with the prevailing OIC position. As its departure point, the
Commission has adopted the premise that any criticism of the treatment
of women under Islamic law is based on misperception or ill-will rather
than any possibility of conflict between Islam and universal human rights
norms.220 To this end, it has ―agreed to work closely with the [OIC‘s]
Fiqh Academy in order to correct the misperceptions regarding the rights

216

217

218

219

220

Third Ministerial Conference on Women‘s Role in the Development of OIC Member States,
Mechanism for the Implementation of the OPAAW, art. I(14), OIC Doc. OIC/3WCOD/2010/MECH, (Dec. 19–21, 2010). The alternative approaches to Islamic sources Yakin
Ertürk alludes to above likely would be foreclosed from such a debate. See U.N. Human Rights
Council, supra note 51, at ¶ 40.
In contrast, the OIC is at ease invoking the applicability of international norms for others. For
example, calling ―upon the international community to shoulder its full responsibility in
compelling Israel to abide by the principles of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights. . .‖;
and calling on the government of India to ―Ensure the safety and protection of the Muslims and
all Islamic Holy Sites throughout India in accordance with its responsibilities and obligations
under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.‖ See Council of Foreign Ministers, Res. 2/41C On Palestinian Cultural Affairs, at ¶ 5, OIC Doc. OIC /CFM-41/2014/CSF /RES/FINAL, (Jun.
18–19, 2014); see also Council of Foreign Ministers, Res. 3/41-C, On Protection of Islamic Holy
Places, at ¶ 6(a), OIC Doc. OIC /CFM-41/2014/CSF /RES/FINAL, (Jun. 18–19, 2014).
Council of Foreign Ministers, Res. 4/41-C On Social and Family Issues, at ¶ 10, OIC Doc.
OIC/CFM-41/2014/CSF/RES/FINAL, (June 18–19, 2014).
This conclusion derives from the substance of the CRCI and OIC member state standing and
open-ended Shari‘ah-based reservations to CEDAW.
This mirrors the position espoused by the OIC under the OPAAW. See OPAAW, supra note 196.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2978646

BLITT_PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

Vol. 34, No. 4

5/9/2017 1:14 PM

OIC‟s Response to Women‟s Rights

801

of women and children in Islam, as well as the protection of the
family.‖221 The Commission has further volunteered to lobby at the UN
by ―holding seminars and side events‖ intended to counter what it claims
(without substantiating) is ―massive propaganda against Islam by certain
international NGOs.‖222
Other examples of IPHRC‘s unwavering affirmation of the OIC
position abound. In two separate addresses given during the
Commission‘s seventh session, Ambassador Ilham Ibrahim, the IPHRC
chair, omitted any mention of women‘s equality—an especially
egregious oversight given that session‘s theme focused on ―the
protection of family values.‖223 Furthermore, the IPHRC continues to
herald the CDHRI as a legitimate measure for women‘s equality.224 This,
despite long-standing concerns surrounding the declaration‘s
compatibility with international human rights norms and the fact that the
OIC CFM previously had tasked the Commission ―to review [the] OIC
Human Rights Declaration against existing universal human rights
instruments and make suggestions for its improvement, if and where
necessary.‖225
One might argue the IPHRC‘s human rights analysis and
activities are more nuanced and may signal a challenge to the OIC‘s
conventional approach. However, any such nuance remains faithful to
the organization‘s overarching modus operandi, namely upholding vague
Islamic norms as the first priority, even at the expense of women‘s
equality. For example, alongside its endorsement of the CDHRI, the
IPHRC has also affirmed the ―United Nations Bill of Rights and other

221

222
223

224

225

M. K. Ibrahim, IPHHRC Chairperson, Statement at the Sixth Session of IPHRC, ¶ 3(B)(i) (Nov.
6,
2014),
http://www.oiciphrc.org/data/sessions/closing%20statement%20of%20the%20IPHRC%20Chair%206%20Nov
%202014.pdf. The International Islamic Fiqh Academy (IIFA) is a subsidiary organ of the OIC
created in 1981 and based in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. It is tasked with studying ―contemporary
problems from the Sharia point of view and [trying] to find the solutions in conformity with the
Sharia through an authentic interpretation of its content.‖ Subsidiary Organs, ORG. OF ISLAMIC
COOPERATION http://www.oic-oci.org/oicv3/page/?p_id=64&p_ref=33&lan=en#FIQH (last
visited Mar. 17, 2017).
Ibrahim, supra note 221, at ¶ 3(b)(iii).
Ilham Ibrahim, IPHRC Chairperson, Statement at the Seventh Session IPHRC 3 (Apr. 21, 2015),
http://www.oic-iphrc.org/data/sessions/Statement_by_amb_Ilham_en.pdf.
OIC-IPHRC 9th Session: Outcome Document of Thematic Debate On ‗Impact of Women
Empowerment On Sustainable Development of Member States‘, (May 4, 2016).
Council of Foreign Ministers, Res. 1/42-LEGAL, Follow-Up and Coordination of Action in the
Field of Human Rights, ¶ 12 (May 27–28, 2015) (At the time of writing, nothing has
materialized out of this request).
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international human rights instruments, including the CEDAW.‖226
Pooling these instruments together may signal a willingness to recognize
compatibility between Islamic and international human rights norms.
Yet, this compatibility is asserted without substantiation and in the face
of member state practice to the contrary. This ongoing tension is readily
discernable even within the IPHRC‘s own policy statements. For
example, the Commission boldly asserts the ―importance of gender
equality and avoiding stereotyped role of women‖ and the need to
address these issues ―at all levels through appropriate training and
education.‖227 At the same time, it perpetuates (in the same statement) the
very stereotypes it purports to condemn, for example, by endorsing
traditional roles and responsibilities of women within the family as
―nutritional gatekeepers, saving stimulators and wellbeing
moderators.‖228
Although particularly acute in the context of family (discussed
separately below), this distorted understanding of women‘s equality
ultimately permeates the IPHRC‘s work. It is encapsulated in a
disingenuous vision that professes to endorse equality while all at once
restricting its scope and application. Consider the IPHRC‘s qualified
position ―that men and women enjoy equal human dignity and
fundamental human rights but have different roles and responsibilities
within the family and society, and that Islam nowhere implies superiority
or inferiority to either of the sexes.‖229 The Commission appears to have
satisfied itself that this vague determination represents an authoritative
policy statement on women‘s equality. Women and other concerned
observers, however, are left to ponder two critical questions. First, how
does the Commission‘s understanding of ―different roles and
responsibilities within the family and society‖ implicate actual equality?
Second, what specific religious sources does the Commission rely upon

226

IPHRC 9th Session Outcome Document, supra note 224.
Id.
228
Abdul Wahab, IPHRC Chairperson Statement to Thematic Debate. http://www.oiciphrc.org/data/sessions/Amb%20Abdulwahab%20statementt%20For%20the%20thematic%20de
bate%20on%20Women%20Empowerment%20REVISED.pdf.
229
Press Release, OIC Independent Permanent Human Rights Commission (IPHRC) Concludes its
6th
Regular
Session
in
Jeddah
(Nov.
1–6,
2014),
http://www.oiciphrc.org/data/sessions/Final%20Communique%20of%20the%20IPHRC%206th%20session%20
-%206%20Nov%202014.pdf; see also Press Release, IPHRC reaffirmed the importance of
family as the natural and fundamental unit of society that is entitled to protection by State and
Society, during its thematic debate on ―Protection of Family Values‖ (Apr. 21, 2015),
http://www.oic-iphrc.org/en/press_details/?id=84.
227
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in concluding that neither sex is superior according to Islam, and does its
interpretation concur with that of OIC member states?
4. Different “Roles and Responsibilities”: A Frontal Challenge to
Women‟s Equality
In attempting to answer the first question, one might query
whether the Commission has in mind the same equality that flows from
the different roles and responsibilities foisted on women in the Islamic
Republic of Iran. This arrangement has been described elsewhere as
being:
[G]rounded in a culture of patriarchy, and reinforced (and ostensibly
justified) by a patriarchal interpretation of Islam‘s holy sources. A
cornerstone of the Islamic Republic‘s gender ideology is the
conviction that men and women are fundamentally ―different‖ beings
in nature. This conviction is derived from a conservative Islamic
world view in which men and women exist, function, and relate to
one another only within the limits of a ―natural‖ gender hierarchy.
That is, due to God-given differences in terms of both biology and
psychology, men and women have different roles and responsibilities
in society. In Iran, this has translated into a reality for women in
which they occupy a subordinate status to men.230

Iran is but one state and surely, its idiosyncratic interpretation of Islamic
law does not govern overall OIC policy. This said, even a cursory
examination of the CEDAW regime illustrates that many parties seek to
maintain similar patriarchal and religion-justified understandings of
women‘s roles and responsibilities that are antithetical to the treaty‘s
objective of eliminating inequality and discrimination. For example,
article 16 of CEDAW provides: ―States Parties shall take all appropriate
measures to eliminate discrimination against women in all matters
relating to marriage and family relations and in particular shall ensure, on
a basis of equality of men and women. . .[t]he same rights and
responsibilities;‖ ―during marriage and at its dissolution;‖ ―as parents,
irrespective of their marital status;‖ and ―with regard to guardianship,

230

Rebecca Barlow & Shahram Akbarzadeh, Prospects for Feminism in the Islamic Republic of
Iran, 30 HUM. RTS Q. 21, 23 (2008) (emphasis added) (concluding that ―Iranian women appear
to be increasingly disillusioned with religious-oriented feminism as it has proven unable to
achieve lasting change…The solution to the plight of Iranian women is no longer seen coming
solely or primarily from within Islam, but rather in the separation of the state and its legal codes
from strict religious doctrine.‖ Id. at 40).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2978646

BLITT_PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

804

5/9/2017 1:14 PM

Wisconsin International Law Journal

wardship, trusteeship and adoption of children.‖231 Further, in its General
Recommendation 29, the CEDAW Committee clarified the obligation to
ensure full equality and nondiscrimination between men and women in
the context of personal status matters:
Inequality in the family underlies all other aspects of discrimination
against women and is often justified in the name of ideology,
tradition and culture. An examination of States parties‘ reports
reveals that in many States, the rights and responsibilities of married
partners are governed by civil or common law principles; religious
or customary laws and practices; or some combination of such laws
and practices; that discriminate against women and do not comply
with the principles set out in the Convention.232

Accordingly, the Committee reiterated its longstanding view that article
16 is a core provision of CEDAW, that ―[n]either traditional, religious or
cultural practice nor incompatible domestic laws and policies can justify
violations of the Convention,‖ and as such, ―reservations to article 16,
whether lodged for national, traditional, religious or cultural reasons, are
incompatible with the Convention and therefore impermissible.‖233
Despite this clear stance, Article 16 has ―the greatest number of
reservations, either to the entire provision or to individual subsections‖234
among all CEDAW provisions. In 2009, thirty-four States Parties to
CEDAW maintained reservations to all or part of this provision, with
more than half of these being OIC members.235 By 2016, this number had
moved slightly down to thirty states reserving, with OIC members still
representing more than half of those reserving states.236 Notably, Tunisia
and Morocco did withdraw reservations to article 16 in 2011 and 2014
respectively.237 While these withdrawals may do away with the states
231
232

233

234
235
236

237

CEDAW, supra note 64, at art. 16(1)(c), (d), (f) (emphasis added).
Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, General Recommendation on
Article 16 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women,
U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/GC/29, ¶ 2 (Oct. 30, 2013) (emphasis added).
Id. at ¶ 54; Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Rep. of Its Nineteenth
Session, supra note 68, at ¶ 17.
Freeman, supra note 66, at 6.
Id.
Data produced by updating Freeman‘s 2009 survey of CEDAW reservations using current
information from the UN Treaty Collection database. Depositary Notifications (CNs) by the
Secretary-General,
U.N.
TREATY
COLLECTION,
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/Content.aspx?path=DB/CNs/pageIntro_en.xml (last visited Mar. 17,
2017).
CEDAW, Morocco: Partial Withdrawal of Reservations Made Upon Accession, U.N. Doc.
C.N.176.2011.TREATIES-2 (Apr. 18, 2011) (Depositary Notification); see also CEDAW,
Tunisia: Withdrawal of the Declaration With Regard To Article 15(4) and of the Reservations To
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parties‘ explicit rejection of women‘s equality, the move is necessarily
tempered by the fact that both states continue to maintain a general
catchall declaration subjecting CEDAW implementation to compatibility
with unspecified provisions of Islam.238 To drive home this important
point, it bears recalling that Jordan, a more ―moderate‖ OIC state than
Iran, maintains that it must preserve its specific reservations239 to
CEDAW article 16(1)(c), (d) and (g) precisely because ―[u]nlike other
Islamic countries, Jordan had not entered a blanket reservation to all
articles that [run] counter to [Shari‘ah] law.‖240
The example of Jordan‘s reservations to CEDAW is particularly
instructive in unpacking the IPHRC‘s position on gender equality for two
reasons. First, Jordan is not Iran; and yet, its approach to women‘s
equality still seeks to uphold different roles and responsibilities that
result in inequality and discrimination.241 This position is so
fundamentally entrenched that Jordan‘s recent Royal Commission on the
amendment of the Constitution ―found that there was no need‖ to add sex
or gender as a protected class under the Constitution‘s nondiscrimination
clause, because it already ―provides that Jordanians are equal before the
law and that no distinction shall be made among them in respect of rights

238

239

240

241

Articles 9(2), 16 (C), (D), (F), (G), (H) and 29(1) Made Upon Ratification, U.N. Doc.
C.N.220.2014.TREATIES-IV.8 (Apr. 23, 2014) (Depositary Notification).
Morocco‘s declaration expresses its readiness to apply the provisions of article 2 (addressing
discrimination) provided, inter alia, ―They do not conflict with the provisions of the Islamic
Shariah.‖ See C.N.176.2011.TREATIES-2, supra note 237. Tunisia‘s declaration similarly
provides ―it shall not take any organizational or legislative decision in conformity with the
requirements of this Convention where such a decision would conflict with the provisions of
chapter I of the Tunisian Constitution.‖ See Id. Among other things, Chapter 1 of the Tunisian
constitution declares Islam the state religion and establishes the state as ―the guardian of
religion.‖ CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF TUNISIA 2014, arts. 1, 6,
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Tunisia_2014.pdf (UNDP & Int‘l IDEA trans.)
According to Human Rights Watch, ―Although Tunisia has one of the most progressive personal
status codes in the region, the code still contains discriminatory provisions.‖ Tunisia: Landmark
Action on Women‟s Rights, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Apr. 30, 2014, 11:55 p.m.),
https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/04/30/tunisia-landmark-action-womens-rights.
The effect of a ―reservation‖ or ―declaration‖ hinges not upon the label assigned by the invoking
state, but rather upon the substance of the statement conveyed. Under the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties, a reservation ―means a unilateral statement, however phrased or named,
made by a State. . .whereby it purports to exclude or to modify the legal effect of certain
provisions of [a] treaty. . .‖ Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 2(1)(d), Jan. 27,
1980, 1155 U.N.T.S 331 (emphasis added).
Comm. on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women [CEDAW],
Summary Record of the 1033rd Meeting of Its Fifty-First Session, 4, U.N. Doc.
CEDAW/C/SR.1033 (Mar. 13, 2012).
CEDAW, Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination
Against Women: Jordan, UN Doc. CEDAW/C/JOR/CO/5 (Mar. 23, 2012).
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and duties regardless of their race, language or religion.‖242 The
takeaway from this reasoning is simple; upholding a constitutional
allowance for different roles and responsibilities presumably excuses any
discrimination or inequality that may flow from such differential
treatment.
5. Shari‟ah and Women‟s Equality
The other reason Jordan is instructive relates to the second
question posed above, namely, on what basis does the Commission
conclude that neither sex is superior according to Islam and to what
extent does this position concur with the actual practice of OIC member
states. For Jordan, the government‘s underlying justification for
maintaining different gender roles and responsibilities flows from an
Islamic imperative. As the government explained to the CEDAW
Committee in 2006:
Jordan maintains its reservation to. . .article 16[c] of the Convention
on the grounds that it is incompatible with the Shari‘a. Under
Jordanian law, marriage is not based on equality of rights and duties
for husband and wife, but on reciprocity, i.e. rights for the wife with
corresponding duties for the husband, and rights for the husband with
corresponding duties for the wife. It follows that the concept of
equality between spouses cannot be made to fit into the existing legal
system.243

Jordan has continued to assert this position, even in the face of repeated
expressions of concern by the CEDAW Committee.244 In 2010, it
reported to the Committee that ―despite demands from many women‘s
organizations, Jordan maintains its reservation to [article 16] because it is

242

243

244

CEDAW, Concluding Observations on the Fifth Periodic Report of Jordan, Information Provided
by Jordan in Follow-up to the Concluding Observations, UN Doc. CEDAW/C/JOR/CO/5/Add.1,
at 1 (Dec. 2, 2014) (emphasis added). Article 6(i) of the Kingdom‘s constitution states:
―Jordanians shall be equal before the law. There shall be no discrimination between them as
regards to their rights and duties on grounds of race, language or religion.‖ THE CONSTITUTION
OF
THE
HASHEMITE
KINGDOM
OF
JORDAN,
Jan.
1,
1952,
art.
6,
http://www.constitutionnet.org/files/2011_constitution_-_jordan_english_final.pdf (Int‘l IDEA
trans., 2012).
CEDAW, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 18 of the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Combined
Third and Fourth Reports of States Parties: Jordan, ¶ 248, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/JOR/3-4 (Mar.
10, 2006) (emphasis added).
See CEDAW, Concluding Comments of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination
Against Women: Jordan, ¶ 11, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/JOR/CO/4, (Aug. 10, 2007).
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incompatible with the provisions of Islamic law, the Shari‘a . . . . Over
and above this legal reason . . . we may add the fact that husband and
wife have different responsibilities in the framework of a single
family.‖245 Similarly, Jordan‘s sixth periodic report, filed in 2015,
asserted that the CEDAW Committee‘s recommendations to withdraw
article 16 reservations ―failed to meet with Jordan‘s approval. . .on the
grounds of their incompatibility with Islamic Shariah.‖246
Ultimately, Jordan‘s steadfast defense of different gender roles
and responsibilities—as well as its justification that such differentiation
is dictated by Shari‘ah—is not the outlier view. The disproportionately
high number of OIC states taking reservations to CEDAW and the
outcomes of their CEDAW reviews testify to this reality.247 If the
IPHRC‘s vague generalizations about Shari‘ah compatibility with
universal human rights mirror this more ―moderate‖ stance, then its
position on women‘s rights necessarily translates into a vision that
entrenches systemic inequality and discrimination by accommodating,
among other things, the practice of polygamy (for men only),248
restrictions on a woman‘s right to work and to choose a spouse freely,249
245

246

247

248
249

CEDAW, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 18 of the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Fifth Periodic
Report of States Parties: Jordan, ¶ 302, UN Doc. CEDAW/C/JOR/5 (Sept. 24, 2010) (emphasis
added) [hereinafter CEDAW, Fifth Periodic Report of States Parties: Jordan].
CEDAW, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 18 of the
Convention, Sixth Periodic Report of States Parties Due in 2016: Jordan, ¶ 108, U.N. Doc.
CEDAW/C/JOR/6 (June 25, 2015). According to the government, ―the Jordan Islamic Scholars
League sent a letter to the speaker of the House of Representatives calling upon the house not to
approve lifting the reservations to the Convention, on the grounds that they violate Islamic
Shariah. Accordingly, the issue of lifting the reservations has to be dealt with very sensitively
and gradually, in a manner that balances the promotion of women‟s human rights with the
obligation to reject whatever contradicts the provisions of Islamic Shariah.‖ Id. (emphasis
added).
See e.g., CEDAW, Concluding Observations on the Combined Fourth and Fifth Periodic Reports
of Lebanon, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/LBN/CO/4-5 (Nov. 24, 2015); CEDAW, Concluding
Observations on the Combined Fourth and Fifth Periodic Reports of the Gambia, U.N. Doc.
CEDAW/C/GMB/CO/4-5 (July 28, 2015); CEDAW, Concluding Observations on the Fourth
Periodic Report of Pakistan, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/PAK/CO/4 (Mar. 27, 2013); CEDAW,
Concluding Observations on the Combined Initial and Second Periodic Reports of Afghanistan,
U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/AFG/CO/1-2 (Jul. 30, 2013); CEDAW, Concluding Observations of the
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women on the Initial Report of the
United Arab Emirates, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/ARE/CO/1 (Feb. 5, 2010).
CEDAW, Combined 3rd and 4th Reports of States Parties: Jordan, supra note 243, ¶ 246.
CEDAW, Rep. of Jordan on Its Fifty-first Session, Summary Record (partial) of the 1034th
meeting, ¶ 42, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/SR.1034 (Mar. 22, 2012); see also CEDAW, Combined 3rd
and 4th Reports of States Parties: Jordan, supra note 243, ¶ 245; see also CEDAW, Concluding
Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women: Jordan,
supra note 241, at ¶ 49 (―The Committee notes with concern the continued application of the
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discriminatory gender-based inheritance rules,250 and the reinforcement
of ―traditional images of women‘s roles and responsibilities in school
books and curricula that perpetuate girls‘ and women‘s disadvantaged
status.‖251
Against this record of practice—specifically OIC states‘
interpretation and application of Shari‘ah law—the IPHRC‘s claim that
―discriminatory practices compromising the rights of women should not
be attributed to Islam‖ simply cannot be reconciled without concrete
evidence to the contrary. At least for the time being, therefore, the
IPHRC has fallen dramatically short. Indeed, its vague assertions about
Islam appear to have been reached without any meaningful effort at
analysis or substantiation, nor any comprehensive scrutiny of the
deleterious OIC member state policies impacting women‘s equality and
actively being justified on the basis of Shari‘ah.252
The IPHRC might be tempted to explain all of this inconsistency
away by asserting, like the Jordanian government, that ―the provisions of
Islamic law . . . contain a positive discrimination in favour of the
woman,‖253 and that, accordingly, the imposition of different roles and
responsibilities is premised on some form of affirmative action intended
to protect women rather than perpetuate their disadvantage. Such a
framing would not be a leap. For example, the 2004 Arab Charter on
Human Rights provides, ―men and women are equal in respect of human
dignity, rights and obligations within the framework of the positive
discrimination established in favour of women by the Islamic
Shari‘ah.‖254 Yet, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights has
rejected such a formulation as being ―incompatib[le]. . .with international

250
251
252

253
254

discriminatory provisions contained in the State party‘s Personal Status Act, in particular the
permissibility of polygamy, the requirement of walis (guardians) for women for the marriage
notwithstanding the woman‘s consent, and the restrictions on women‘s right to work and to
divorce.‖).
CEDAW, Fifth Periodic Report of States Parties: Jordan, supra note 245, at ¶ 315.
UN Doc. CEDAW/C/JOR/CO/5, supra note 241, at ¶ 35.
As of this writing, the IPHRC has yet to make publicly available any detailed analysis on
women‘s rights under Islam. In 2016, the IPHRC announced that it ―discussed and adopted‖ a
study on the subject of ―Women and Men‘s inheritance in Islamic Sharia‖ produced by one of its
subcommittees. Press Release, Indep. Permanent Human Rights Comm‘n., OIC Independent
Permanent Human Rights Commission concludes its 9th Regular Session in Jeddah (May 5,
2016),
http://www.oiciphrc.org/data/sessions/IPHRC%209th%20Session%20Concluding%20Press%20Release%205%
20May%202016.pdf.
CEDAW, Fifth Periodic Report of States Parties: Jordan, supra note 245, at ¶ 305.
Arab Charter on Human Rights, League of Arab States, art. 3(3), May 22, 2004 (entered into
force March 15, 2008), reprinted in 12 INT‘L HUM. RTS. REP. 893 (2005).
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norms and standards.‖255 As long as the IPHRC fails to muster some
tangible, detailed, and authoritative indication that OIC member states
have somehow consistently misinterpreted or misapplied Islamic law,
any approach to equality qualified by an effort to legitimate ―different
roles and responsibilities‖ and coupled with vague assurances that
―neither sex is superior‖ must be rejected as contrary to IHRL. To recall
the UN Working Group on Discrimination Against Women, ―neither
cultural diversity nor freedom of religion may justify discrimination
against women. Discriminatory, repressive and violent practices against
women should be eliminated, whatever their origins, including those
founded in culture or religion.‖256
B. PROTECTION OF FAMILY VALUES: NEXUS FOR DISCRIMINATION
AGAINST WOMEN, ON THE BASIS OF SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND
GENDER IDENTITY, AND AGAINST OTHERS
As observed above, the OIC‘s endorsement of different roles and
responsibilities for men and women operates to significantly undermine
gender equality and facilitate the perpetuation of discriminatory practices
directed against women. The necessity for these unequal arrangements,
in the OIC‘s view, flows from Islamic religious imperatives. These same
imperatives similarly inform the organization‘s broader concern for
preserving its particular vision of ―Islamic family values‖257 in the face of
perceived ―ethical and intellectual challenges threatening [the Islamic
family‘s] identity and existence.‖258 The CDHRI encapsulates this vision
by resolving that marriage is a necessary precursor to the formation of
family and—in contravention of the UDHR—by enabling states to
restrict the right to marriage on the basis of religion.259 Secretary General

255

256
257

258
259

Press Release, UN Office of High Comm‘r Human Rights, Statement by UN High Comm‘r For
Human Rights on the Entry Into Force of the Arab Charter On Human Rights (Jan. 30, 2008),
https://web.archive.org/web/20130116101635/http://www.unhchr.ch/huricane/huricane.nsf/view
01/6C211162E43235FAC12573E00056E19D?opendocument.
UN Doc. A/HRC/29/40, supra note 205, at ¶ 205.
2008 OIC Charter, supra note 6, at art. 1(14); see also OIC, 2025 Program of Action, ¶ 48, OIC
Doc. OIC/SUM-13/2016/POA-Final.
OIC Resolution No. 4/42-C On Social and Family Issues, supra note 91, at preamble.
The CDHRI provides: ―The family is the foundation of society, and marriage is the basis of its
formation. Men and women have the right to marriage, and no restrictions stemming from race,
colour or nationality shall prevent them from enjoying this right.‖ CDHRI, supra note 32, at art.
5(a). In contrast, the UDHR states: ―Men and women of full age, without any limitation due to
race, nationality or religion, have the right to marry and to found a family. They are entitled to
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Madani likewise has asserted that protection of Islamic family values is
of ―utmost importance‖ to the OIC, and has urged the organization‘s
institutions to incorporate an ―Islamic perspective‖ in interrelated fields
with a view to projecting unified OIC views and positions.260
The OIC‘s advocacy of an Islamic religious perspective in the
family context presents an expanded challenge to safeguarding women‘s
equality and nondiscrimination on the international level. As the UN
Working Group on Discrimination Against Women has observed:
While gender stereotypes pervade all aspects of human existence,
women‘s rights are at particular risk in the family, which is a locus
for the perpetuation of traditional values. The family is a product of
patriarchal culture and a vital institution for upholding the
patriarchy. . .women‘s equal rights in the family are closely linked to
their rights in all areas of life, including public and political life and
social, economic and cultural life.261

In addition to triggering further restrictions on women‘s rights, including
limiting their sexual and reproductive health, the push to protect Islamic
family values also subverts the rights of others, including children,
refugees,262 and LGBTI individuals. Indeed, as demonstrated below, in

260

261
262

equal rights as to marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution.‖ UDHR, supra note 16, at art.
16(1).
Press Release, Indep. Permanent Human Rights Comm‘n., OIC Independent Permanent Human
Rights Commission (IPHRC) concludes its Seventh Regular Session in Jeddah held from 19–23
April 2015 (Apr. 23, 2015), http://www.oic-iphrc.org/en/press_details/?id=78. The IPHRC‘s
chairperson previously affirmed the Commission would work closely with the OIC‘s Fiqh
Academy ―to correct the misperceptions regarding the rights of women and children in Islam, as
well as the protection of the family.‖ Ibrahim, Statement at the Sixth Session of IPHRC, supra
note 221, at ¶ 3(B)(i).
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/29/40, supra note 205, at ¶ 22.
A detailed treatment of the potentially deleterious impact Islamic family values may have on
child and refugee rights must be reserved for another occasion due to space constraints.
Children‘s rights are, however, briefly noted below in the context of sexual and reproductive
rights. It also bears noting that the OHCHR has recognized that ―States‘ responsibility to protect
individuals from discrimination extends to the family sphere, where rejection and discriminatory
treatment of and violence against LGBT and intersex family members [including children] can
have serious, negative consequences for the enjoyment of human rights.‖ OHCHR, Report on
Discrimination and Violence Against Individuals Based on their Sexual Orientation and Gender
Identity, at ¶ 66, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/29/23, (May 4, 2015). Similarly, what treatment would await
a ―non-traditional‖ refugee family seeking protection in an OIC member state, given the
CDHRI‘s provision that ―The country of refuge shall ensure [asylum] protection until he reaches
safety, unless asylum is motivated by an act which Shari‟ah regards as a crime‖? CDHRI, supra
note 32, at art. 12 (emphasis added). Even without running afoul of Shari‘ah law, the CRCI
opens the door to discrimination against refugee children by requiring only that parties ensure
―as much as possible, that refugee children. . . enjoy the rights provided.‖ CRCI, supra note 75,
at art. 21 (emphasis added). This approach stands in sharp contrast to the equal protection
afforded refugee children under the UNCRC: ―States Parties shall take appropriate measures to
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seeking to uphold its narrow vision of family, the OIC has emerged as
one of the staunchest opponents of applying equality and
nondiscrimination protections on the basis of SOGI.
1. Sexual and Reproductive Health
According to the CEDAW committee, the right to sexual and
reproductive health263 includes ―the right to make free and responsible
decisions and choices, free of violence, coercion and discrimination,
regarding matters concerning one‘s body and sexual and reproductive
health.‖264 Like other rights, sexual and reproductive health operates
interdependently with other provisions of CEDAW. For example, when
combined with the right to education and the right to nondiscrimination
and equality between men and women, the right to sexual and
reproductive health also ―entails a right to education on sexuality and
reproduction that is comprehensive, non-discriminatory, evidence-based,
scientifically accurate and age appropriate.‖265 The right to sexual and
reproductive health ―is also indivisible from and interdependent with
other human rights‖ enshrined elsewhere under international law.266 For
example, ―denial of abortion often leads to maternal mortality and
morbidity, which in turn constitutes a violation of the right to life or
security, and in certain circumstances can amount to torture or cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment.‖267

263

264
265
266
267

ensure that a child who is seeking refugee status or who is considered a refugee. . .
shall. . .receive appropriate protection and humanitarian assistance in the enjoyment of
applicable rights set forth in the present Convention and in other international human rights or
humanitarian instruments.‖ UNCRC, supra note 76, at art. 22(1). Considering the IPHRC‘s
approach to sexual orientation and protection of the family, its call to ―find ways and means to
effectivily [sic] protect the family and family integration in conflict and post-confict [sic]
situations as well as other emergencies and situations such as migrant and refugee families‖
appears destined to perpetuate and condone discriminatory outcomes in the context of refugee
rights. Press Release, IPHRC Thematic Debate on ―Protection of Family Values‖, supra note
229.
This right ―is an integral part of the right to health enshrined in article 12 of the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.‖ Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm. on Econ.,
Soc., & Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 22 (2016) on the Right to Sexual and
Reproductive Health (Article 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights), U.N. Doc. E/C.12/GC/22, at ¶ 1 (May 2, 2016).
Id. at ¶ 5.
Id. at ¶ 9.
Id. at ¶ 10.
Id.
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The CEDAW Committee has similarly concluded that respect for
nondiscrimination in the context of the right to sexual and reproductive
health encompasses ―the right of all persons, including lesbian, gay,
bisexual, transgender and intersex persons, to be fully respected for their
sexual orientation, gender identity and intersex status.‖268 Here, the
Committee further cautioned that LGBTI and other vulnerable
individuals and groups risk being ―disproportionately affected by
intersectional discrimination in the context of sexual and reproductive
health.‖269 As such, the state maintains an obligation to ensure that its
laws and policies effectively ―prevent and eliminate discrimination,
stigmatization and negative stereotyping that hinder access to sexual and
reproductive health.‖270 Moreover, any ―[m]easures to guarantee nondiscrimination and substantive equality should be [designed to]
overcome the often exacerbated impact that intersectional discrimination
has on the realization of the right to sexual and reproductive health.‖271
The example of Jordan is again helpful here for illustrating the
chasm between the CEDAW Committee and the OIC concerning the
right to sexual and reproductive health. From Jordan‘s convoluted
perspective,
Both spouses have an equal right to use contraception. The husband
does not have the right to withdraw, except with his wife‘s
permission, and the wife does not have the right to use contraception,
except with her husband‘s permission. The Islamic religion
authorizes the use of modern family planning methods while
prohibiting birth control.272

Reconciling this position with CEDAW‘s fundamental guarantee that a
woman has ―the right to make free and responsible decisions and
choices‖ 273 with respect to her body and sexual and reproductive health
would appear difficult at best.
For its part, the IPHRC insists only a husband and wife are
capable of achieving ―a healthy and stable family,‖ and that the
enjoyment of basic rights within the family unit must be premised on the
notions of mutual support and gender complementarity ―enshrined in

268
269
270
271
272
273

Id. at ¶ 23.
Id. at ¶ 30.
Id. at ¶ 31.
Id. at ¶ 30.
CEDAW, Fifth Periodic Report of States Parties: Jordan, supra note 245, at ¶ 308.
Econ. & Soc. Council, supra note 263, at ¶ 5.
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Islamic values.‖274 Here too, the Commission has used its platform to
validate the OIC‘s stance on sexual and reproductive health rights.
Mirroring the OIC CFM, the IPHRC has framed the CEDAW
Committee‘s observations above as a threat to the Islamic conception of
human rights. During an IPHRC thematic debate on the ―Protection of
Family Values,‖ the Commission ―condemned the practice of promoting
divisive and non-universal rights of comprehensive sexuality education
to children, which include morally unacceptable concepts, behaviours
and practices.‖275 Further, it rejected official UN-disseminated
publications that reference comprehensive sex education for children and
―the so-called notion of sexual orientation,‖ branding them ―disturbing
and morally unacceptable,‖ ―potentially harmful to the very institution of
family,‖ and ―undermining the spirit of. . .universally accepted human
rights values, norms and instruments.‖276 In concluding its debate, the
IPHRC urged all stakeholders, including NGOs and NHRIs, ―to put the
family at the core of their agendas‖ and avoid ―misconceptions and
controversies‖ which contradict IPHRC‘s vision of family values.277
The IPHRC‘s rejection of sex education programming content
and its framing of such programs as a threat to the institution of family
makes clear that the OIC‘s efforts to protect the family go beyond
controlling women and restricting their equality. Rather, the quest to
safeguard Islamic family values also entails undercutting the rights of
children as well as a rejection of what the Commission derisively terms
―so-called‖ sexual orientation, effectively dismissing out of hand the
application of equality and nondiscrimination principles to the LGBTI
community.278
2. Protecting an “Ideal Family” Demands Religious Conformity, Not
Recognition of Family Diversity
The OIC‘s justification for discriminating on the basis of SOGI
is grounded in religion. Making this position plain, the IPHRC ended its
7th session in 2015 concluding that ―the growing trend of confusing the
definition of family with new and controversial notions of LGBT
IPHRC Thematic Debate on ―Protection of Family Values‖, supra note 229.
Id.
276
Id.
277
Id.
278
The OIC‘s perspective on LGBTI rights in the context of equality and nondiscrimination is
discussed in a forthcoming article.
274
275
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families that were neither universal nor recognized by international
human rights standards‖279 was diametrically opposed to the Koran‘s
concept of a ―Good society.‖280 This good society, in the IPHRC‘s words,
can ―only be achieved through the marriage between man and woman as
husband and wife . . . Any practice that potentially threatens the integrity
of the family should not be seen as part of ‗freedom of choice.‘‖281
Arguably, the IPHRC shows some begrudging willingness to
recognize certain non-traditional family arrangements that break from its
―ideal family consist[ing] of husband and wife.‖282 For example, it
acknowledges that a ―single-parent family, especially woman-headed
family‖ might be accommodated (though not legitimated) ―as the
consequence of divorce and other factors.‖283 The Commission outright
rejects, however, the possibility that a family could be made up of two
men or women who love each other, or that such a familial unit could be
entitled to the same protection owed by the state to ―a long-term
consensual relationship between a man and a woman who are bound by
the reciprocal rights and responsibilities enshrined in Islamic
teachings.‖284
While the IPHRC wrapped up its internal deliberations over
what family is—and what it is not—the OIC continued to take measures
at the UN to protect the organization‘s vision of family. Most notably as
part of this effort, the OIC pushed two contentious resolutions on
―Protection of the Family‖ through the UN Human Rights Council

279

280

281
282
283

284

OIC Independent Permanent Human Rights Commission (IPHRC) Concludes its 7th Regular
Session in Jeddah, supra note 260 (―Future plans and projects that the Commission intends to
deliberate upon [include] strengthening research and writing reports / position papers on the. . .
issue of sexual orientation.‖).
IPHRC Thematic Debate on ―Protection of Family Values‖, supra note 229. Saied Reza Ameli
reaffirms this view on Islam‘s good society: ―Islamic notions of an overriding accountability to
Allah can sometimes clash with Western-secular notions of an overriding priority to uphold civil
rights. For instance, liberal laws regarding homosexual practices or the consumption of alcohol
cause difficulties for the devout Muslim, as they are seen to violate concepts of the good society
and thus offend the Lord.‖ Saied Reza Ameli, The Organisation of the Islamic Conference:
Accountability and Civil Society, in BUILDING GLOBAL DEMOCRACY? CIVIL SOCIETY AND
ACCOUNTABLE GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 157 (Jan Aart Scholte, ed., Cambridge University Press,
2011).
IPHRC Thematic Debate, on ―Protection of Family Values‖, supra note 229.
Id.
Id. (―Islam also provides guidance to protect this kind of family through different mechanisms
such as inheritance, donation as well as the extended familial support system from the
community and the government.‖).
Id.
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(HRC).285 The first resolution, passed in 2014 with all fourteen OIC states
on the HRC voting in favor,286 was procedural in nature. It called for
holding a panel discussion on protection of the family as well as
preparing a report on that discussion.287 At the time, states opposed to the
resolution expressed concern over its substance because it ―did not refer
to family diversity and the individual rights of family members.‖288
The following year, shortly after conclusion of the IPHRC‘s 7th
session, Egypt introduced a second ―Protection of the Family‖ draft
resolution co-sponsored by eighty-five UN member states including the
African Group, the Arab Group, and fifty-five countries from the OIC.289
In the Egyptian ambassador‘s words, the document represented a
―comprehensive substantive omnibus draft resolution on protection of the
family . . . building on . . . 2014‘s procedural resolution.‖290 It also
represented a significant push to entrench a narrow view of what
constitutes family and on that basis establish which families merit
protection of the state. For example, in urging States ―to provide the
family . . . with effective protection and assistance‖291 in the face of
―increasing vulnerabilities,‖292 the resolution recognizes only ―singleheaded households, child-headed households and intergenerational
households‖ as being ―particularly vulnerable to poverty and social
exclusion.‖293
To more fully capture the resolution‘s effort to protect selective
forms of family only, consider that it excludes from recognition ―for
example . . . families comprising [LGBTI] persons; extended families;
self-created and self-defined families; families without children; families
of divorced persons . . . and non-traditional families resulting from

285

286
287
288

289

290
291
292
293

Human Rights Council Res. 26/11, UN Doc. A/HRC/RES/26/11 (Jul. 16, 2014); see also Human
Rights Council Res. 29/22, UN Doc. A/HRC/RES/29/22 (Jul. 22, 2015).
Twenty-six states voted in favor, fourteen voted against, and six abstained.
Human Rights Council Res. 26/11, supra note 285, at ¶¶ 1, 2.
OHCHR, Summary of the Human Rights Council Panel Discussion on the Protection of the
Family, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/28/40, ¶ 23 (2014).
Amr Ramadan, Permanent Representative of Egypt to the UN, Introduction of Draft Resolution
L.25 “Protection of the Family”, Jul. 2, 2015, at ¶ 1. (Albania was the only OIC state to vote
against the resolution. All members of the Arab Group are OIC member states and OIC states
make up 50 percent of the African Group. Palestine had no vote).
Id. at ¶ 3.
Human Rights Council Res. 29/22, supra note 285, at ¶ 20.
Id. at ¶ 8.
Id. at ¶ 23.
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interreligious, intercommunity or inter-caste marriages.‖294 The challenge
this narrow approach poses to the international human rights regime was
evident to other members of the HRC. While acknowledging that
families can make a valuable contribution to strengthening society, the
EU states explained that they would vote against the resolution in the
HRC because it ―fails to recognize a basic and undeniable matter of
fact—that in different cultural, political and social systems, various
forms of the family exist. The recognition of the diversity of family
forms is an essential element that this text lacks.‖295
In addition to recognizing only certain favored family units
under IHRL, the HRC‘s contentious 2015 Resolution 29/22 on
―Protection of the Family‖ also sought to link ―policies and measures to
protect the family‖ to the protection and promotion of the human rights
of its members.296 Much like the OIC‘s effort to place protection for
religion ahead of individual rights protection,297 the 2015 resolution
purports to protect a narrow, OIC-friendly definition of family ahead of
protection for actual individual rights holders, who may be the victim of
human rights abuses generated in the context of family. The problem
with such a formulation is that it enables states to pursue policies that
either discount or altogether trump individual human rights in the name
of protecting their favored family unit. For example, consider the
IPHRC‘s rationalization for having women‘s rights take a backseat for
the good of the family: ―Islam has emphasized women‘s empowerment
in raising a strong and integrated family through harmonious partnership
with other family members, which is not at the cost of some one‟s
disempowerment but for the overall betterment and sustainable
development of all societies.‖298
Resolution 29/22 also required the OHCHR to prepare a report
on state obligations to protect the family.299 The substance of this report,

294

295

296
297
298
299

U.N. Doc. A/HRC/29/40, supra note 205, at ¶ 23. The Working Group concluded that ―Although
several international forums recognize family diversity, including ―in different cultural, political
and social systems‖, many of the aforementioned non-traditional forms of family are not
recognized by all States.‖ Id. at ¶ 24.
European Union, Explanation of Vote, UN Human Rights Council 29th session-Item 3:
A/HRC/29/L.25.
Human Rights Council Res. 29/22, supra note 285, at ¶ 17.
Blitt, supra note 15.
IPHRC 9th Session Outcome Document, supra note 224 (emphasis added).
Human Rights Council Res. 29/22, supra note 285, at ¶ 29.
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released in 2016, is likely to engender strong OIC opposition.300
Arguably, its chief finding refutes the application of any narrow,
―traditional‖ definition for family in the international context. According
to the Office of the High Commissioner, the international community
must:
[R]ecognize the diverse and changing forms of the family institution,
in accordance with the different social, cultural and economic
characteristics of every society; the promotion of equality between
men and women; and the effective protection and promotion of the
rights of women, children, persons with disabilities, older persons
and all family members, without distinction. Moreover, ensuring
universal access to sexual and reproductive health services, including
family planning, should be an integral part of development efforts. 301

Ultimately, the report observes that while states may ―retain some
leeway in defining the concept of family in national legislation, taking
into consideration the various legal systems, religions, customs or
traditions within their society,‖ international law establishes ―at least two
minimum conditions for the recognition and protection of families at the
national level.‖302 These conditions are ―respect for the principle of
equality and non-discrimination . . . [and] the effective guarantee of the
best interest of the child.‖303 Alongside these minimum requirements,
international treaty bodies have elaborated supplemental state
obligations, such as the need to protect specific forms of the family—
including same-sex couples and de facto unions—―in view of the

300

For a baseline, consider the reaction of the Center for Family & Human Rights (C-Fam), a selfdescribed ―pro-family‖ NGO, to the OHCHR report. The organization criticized the report for its
―progressive, and aggressive, attempt to expand the meaning of family in international law and
policy to include same-sex relationships.‖ Stefano Gennarini, UN Report: “There Is No
Definition of the Family,” CENTER FOR FAMILY & HUMAN RIGHTS (C-Fam), (Jan. 29, 2016),
https://c-fam.org/friday_fax/un-report-no-definition-family/. C-Fam previously labeled HRC
Resolution 29/22 a ―big win‖ and ―monumental development for the pro-family movement.‖
Rebecca Oas, Big Win for Traditional Family at UN Human Rights Council, CENTER FOR
FAMILY & HUMAN RIGHTS (Jul. 9, 2015), https://c-fam.org/friday_fax/big-win-for-traditionalfamily-at-un-human-rights-council/. C-Fam is an example of the type of NGO IPHRC refers to
when it recommends ―undertaking advocacy activities at relevant forums, including working
with pro-family NGOs for holding conferences and seminars with the view to promoting and
advancing family values.‖ IPHRC Thematic Debate on ―Protection of Family Values‖, supra
note 229.
301
OHCHR, Rep. Protection of the Family, ¶ 77, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/31/37 (May 2, 2016).
302
Id. at ¶ 26.
303
For example, the UNCRC Committee ―has called upon States to protect children from
discrimination based on their own or their parents‘ or legal guardian‘s sexual orientation or
gender identity.‖ Id. The UNCRC prohibits all forms of abuse of children, including ―based on
their gender, sexual orientation or disability‖ Id. at ¶¶ 42, 44.
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vulnerability of their members in relation to the enjoyment of human
rights.‖304 In light of these findings, the report concludes that
implementation of protection measures for family ―should be guided by
basic human rights principles, including equality and non-discrimination,
and by respect for the rights of individual family members, notably those
who might find themselves in a situation of vulnerability.‖305
The OHCHR report reflects precisely the kind of balanced,
inclusive, and individual rights-respecting policy for family protection
that the OIC, in demanding that religious and traditional norms be
respected above all, is attempting to short-circuit. So antithetical to
international human rights norms is the OIC‘s campaign surrounding
traditional family that—despite securing majority backing of the HRC—
the UN Working Group on Discrimination Against Women bluntly
concluded that the effort ―threaten[s] to undermine international
achievements in the field of human rights in the name of cultural and
religious diversity.‖306
Id. at ¶ 27. While states may not be required to allow same-sex couples to marry, ―the obligation
to protect individuals from discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation extends to ensuring
that unmarried same-sex couples are treated in the same way and entitled to the same benefits as
unmarried opposite-sex couples.‖ Human Rights Council, Rep. of the OHCHR, Discriminatory
Laws and Practices and Acts of Violence Against Individuals Based on Their Sexual Orientation
and Gender Identity, ¶ 68, UN Doc. A/HRC/19/41 (Nov. 17, 2011). Likewise, the UN Working
Group on Discrimination Against Women has concluded ―that the understanding and legal
definition of the family in national legislation should be extended to recognize different forms of
family‖, including ―recognition of same-sex couples, for both women and men.‖ UN Doc.
A/HRC/29/40, supra note 205, at ¶ 25.
305
UN Doc. A/HRC/31/37, supra note 301, at ¶ 50.
306
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/29/40, supra note 205, at ¶ 19. For its part, the OIC regretted the Working
Group‘s ―attempts to redefine the universally established notion of family which is firmly rooted
in International Human Rights Law. We believe that it is beyond the mandate of the Working
Group to criticize [sic] resolution on family which was the outcome of inter-governmental
negotiations and was adopted by Human Rights Council.‖ Statement by Pakistan on Behalf of
OIC During the Interactive Dialogue with the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or
Arbitrary Executions and Working Group on the Issue of Discrimination against Women in Law
and in Practice, 29th Session of Human Rights Council, June 19, 2015. The Working Group also
was highly critical of HRC Resolution 16/3 on promoting human rights and fundamental
freedoms through a better understanding of traditional values of humankind. This contentious
resolution can be traced back to 2009. At the time, it faced stiff opposition by the EU and others
who argued incorporating the ―concept of traditional values. . .could render human rights more
vulnerable . . . [and] could be used to weaken human rights, as enshrined in international
instruments.‖ Press Release, Human Rights Council Adopts Six Resolutions and One Decision
On Discrimination Against Women and Freedom of Expression, Among Others, (Oct. 2, 2009),
http://reliefweb.int/report/myanmar/human-rights-council-adopts-six-resolutions-and-onedecision-discrimination-against. For example, the government of Iran ―has actively sought to
justify paternalism and gender-inequality under the guise of traditional values and cultural
relativism.‖ Letter from Women‘s Rights Activists to Members of the United Nation‘s Economic
and Social Council (Apr. 28, 2010), http://www.unpo.org/content/view/11047/89/ (Over 200
304

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2978646

BLITT_PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

Vol. 34, No. 4

5/9/2017 1:14 PM

OIC‟s Response to Women‟s Rights

819

IV. CONCLUSION
This article has sketched the OIC‘s effort to reinvigorate its
international relevancy and deepen the nature of its engagement on the
international level, particularly as it relates to the substance of IHRL.
Underlying this initiative, the OIC has endorsed the universality of
human rights while continuing to emphasize its own distinctly Islamic
vision. In essence, the organization has taken the position that any
purported rights it deems incompatible with Shari‘ah necessarily fall
outside of the ―normal scope‖ of rights and thus amount to non-universal
and non-obligatory norms. Further, where international bodies may insist
on universality or when the preponderance of evidence validates such a
standpoint, the OIC maintains that Shari‘ah requires IHRL to yield to its
norms.
As demonstrated above in the contexts of women‘s rights and
family, the OIC‘s framing of equality and nondiscrimination—basic
principles upon which the IHRL framework is built—is subject to the
organization‘s invocation of vague Shari‘ah norms. Where the OIC is
confronted with claimed rights that indicate a conflict these rights are
either characterized as non-universal, rendering them non-obligatory, or
alternatively, they are flatly rejected based on incompatibility with
Shari‘ah. As will be confirmed in a forthcoming article that builds on the
arguments raised here, the pattern is similarly evident in the context of
SOGI rights.
The nature of the OIC‘s engagement with IHRL also helps to
explain the organization‘s consistent need to mischaracterize the
substance of the VDPA. Typically, this mischaracterization is manifested
through an overemphasis on the declaration‘s constrained reference to
religious particularities, or by ignoring the document‘s recognition of a
prevailing duty on states to promote and protect all human rights. As
Professor Bassam Tibi has observed:
[C]ultural pluralism cannot be extended so far as to become
tantamount to cultural relativism. Thus to consider practices related
to the violation of human rights. . .as being an expression of a
different culture cannot be tolerated. The pluralism of cultures is a

Iranian human rights activists and seven women‘s rights organizations endorsed the letter.); see
also Robert C. Blitt, Russia‟s „Orthodox‟ Foreign Policy: The Growing Influence of the Russian
Orthodox Church in Shaping Russia‟s Policies Abroad, 33 U. PA. J. INT‘L L. 363, 442–451
(2011) (discussing Russia‘s role in advancing the original ―traditional values‖ resolution and its
impact at the UN).
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supposition which refers to means but not to ends. In particular with
regard to human rights there can be no compromise as far as these
ends are concerned. . . cultural pluralism in the realm of human rights
cannot mean more than a cultural indigenisation of basic individual
human rights in local cultures.307

Deprived of the VDPA‘s international imprimatur, the OIC‘s Shari‘ahfirst resolve is reduced to advocacy of a relativistic understanding of
human rights that directly conflicts with the organization‘s endorsement
of universality. The credibility dilemma inherent with maintaining such a
position on the international level is apparent to the OIC. As such, it has
recently taken to blaming states supportive of IHRL for forcing the
organization into this relativistic corner:
We believe that we should not attempt to pursue as universal values
things that are not universally acceptable. Also, we should not use
universality to shield self proclaimed rights. The attempt to pursue
under the garb of universality, concepts that also force the other side
to use the argument of cultural relativism or religion, is not
acceptable.308

To avoid the appearance of isolation and relativism on the issue of
equality and nondiscrimination, the OIC has enlisted the assistance of the
IPRHC. As demonstrated above, this newly minted principal OIC organ
is premised on a defective mandate, lacks independence, and has
willingly embraced the role of norm validator for the organization, but is
nevertheless depicted as an independent and expert human rights
mechanism. This chimera has created—at least on the surface—an
additional veneer of legitimacy for the OIC‘s efforts to constrain the
scope and application of IHRL. Indeed, the OIC is quick to invoke as
authorative the IPHRC‘s ―clear pronouncements‖309 on a range of human
rights issues, despite the commission‘s failure to undertake any
meaningful and independent enquiry into the substance of rights or the
content of Shari‘ah.
Based on these conclusions, it should be apparent that the OIC‘s
international engagement efforts in the context of equality and
nondiscrimination are deeply problematic. At the same time, the OIC is

307

308

309

Bassam Tibi, Human Rights in Islamic Civilisation and in the West: International Morality as a
Cross-Cultural Foundation, in THE WEST AND ISLAM: TOWARDS A DIALOGUE 59-60 (Zeynep
Durukal Abushusayn & Muhammad Isa Waley eds. 1999).
Statement by Pakistan on behalf of OIC, 31 st HRC Session ID with HC under Item 2, (Mar. 10,
2016) (Interactive dialogue with OHCHR High Commissioner) (emphasis added).
Id.
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but one voice for Islam. There is a strong claim to be made that the
organization even distorts the true essence of Islam and the actual
requirements of Shari‘ah.310 Nevertheless, the OIC, as the proclaimed
―collective voice of the Muslim world,‖ still represents fifty-seven
member states at the UN and flexes an unmatched level of access and
influence, including a sizable and constant presence on the HRC.311 This
influence continues to dominate the narrative on Islam far beyond the
voice of any academic, activist, or NGO, and colors not only the debate
around rights but their substance as well. Considering this reality, and the
need for a concerted response, the article closes with several general
recommendations directed at concerned advocates and policymakers
alike. First, support more defined and rigorous criteria for cooperation
and interaction with the UN OHCHR. Further to this end, given its
established track record, cease cooperation with the IPHRC at the UN
and on the bilateral level until it clearly adopts and endorses (rather than
builds conflict with) existing IHRL norms, including treaty body general
comments. Second, fund organizations and initiatives developing
alternate interpretations of Islam that more fully comport with IHRL, that
report on rights violations in OIC states, and that advocate and educate
for a fuller understanding of equality and nondiscrimination in those
states. Third, identify OIC members that either abstain or vote against
harmful IHRL-related initiatives at the UN and reward them through
trade and other incentives. Further, work through these states to expand
OIC moderation from the inside and to deepen the ―alternate‖
understanding of Islam being developed by Muslim jurists, scholars, and
activists. Fourth, more forcefully and consistently call attention to the
incompatibility of certain OIC positions with IHRL. The practice of
naming and shaming should be made more systematic and more widely
disseminated. Last, further empower moderate voices through greater
international exposure, for example, by identifying witnesses and experts
to testify at the UN and other international fora in the context of equality

310

311

There is a wealth of analysis on this issue. See e.g., U.N. Human Rights Council, supra note 51;
Abdullah Ahmed An-Na‘im, ISLAM AND THE SECULAR STATE: NEGOTIATING THE FUTURE OF
SHARI‘A (Harvard University Press, 2008); see also MOHAMMAD HASHIM KAMALI, FREEDOM
OF EXPRESSION IN ISLAM (Berita Publishing SDN.BHD., 1994); see also Javaid Rehman & Eleni
Polymenopoulou, Is Green a Part of the Rainbow? Sharia, Homosexuality, and LGBT Rights in
the Muslim World, 37 FORDHAM INT‘L L.J. 1 (2013).
At the time of writing, twelve OIC states held membership in the HRC, representing one quarter
of the Council‘s total membership of forty-seven. See OHCHR, Current Membership of the
Human
Rights
Council,
1
January
31
December
2017,
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/Pages/CurrentMembers.aspx.
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and nondiscrimination. This effort should include Muslim women,
LGBTI Muslims, representatives of religious minorities in OIC states,
Islamic scholars, and others.
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